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Note to readers:
Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended 
Americans with Disabilities Act was published in 2013. The article discusses how the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)—which mandates that pregnant employees be 
treated “the same” as other employees “similar in their ability or inability to work”—
should apply to pregnant employees’ requests for workplace accommodations. At the 
time I wrote Gilbert Redux, many lower courts had held that employers could treat 
pregnant employees less favorably than employees with other health conditions, so long 
as they could point to a “pregnancy blind” basis for the distinction, such as compliance 
with a different statutory mandate. I argued that this interpretation was erroneous, 
providing both textual analysis and historical context for my claim. My concern was 
spurred by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA), which 
greatly expanded the range of health conditions that could qualify as disabilities under 
the ADA. Under the reasoning employed by some lower courts, the enhanced support 
for individuals with disabilities could have the perverse effect of decreasing employers’ 
obligations to pregnant employees.
In 2015, two years after Gilbert Redux was published, the Supreme Court decided Young 
v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The plaintiff in Young argued that
the PDA required accommodation of her pregnancy because UPS routinely 
accommodated many other health conditions. The Court held—as I argued in Gilbert 
Redux—that lower courts erred in holding that ADA-accommodated employees could 
not be used as comparators under the PDA. 
The facts that gave rise to Young predated the effective date of the ADAAA, and thus 
the Court had no cause to engage directly with the significance of the changes that 
statute made to the ADA. I believe that many of the arguments I made in Gilbert Redux 
remain relevant in considering how the PDA and the amended ADA interact. However, 
because the Young Court’s interpretation of the PDA differs in some respects from the 
interpretation I had advocated in Gilbert Redux, I have published a companion article, 
The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act after Young v. UPS, which is available at 50 U.C. Davis Law Review 1423 (2017) 
and on SSRN (abstract id=2948666), to update my analysis to incorporate Young. 
Readers may find it helpful to read this newer article in conjunction with Gilbert Redux. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221332
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Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and 
the Amended Americans with 
Disabilities Act 
Deborah A. Widiss* 
Pregnancy — a health condition that only affects women — raises 
complicated questions regarding the interaction of employment policies 
addressing sex discrimination and those addressing disability. The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), enacted in 1978, mandates that 
employers “shall” treat pregnant employees “the same for all employment-
related purposes” as other employees “similar in their ability or inability 
to work.” Despite the clarity of this language, some courts permit 
employers to treat pregnant employees less favorably than employees with 
other health conditions, so long as the employer does so pursuant to a 
“pregnancy-blind” policy, such as accommodating only workplace injuries 
or only disabilities protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”). Under this reasoning, recent amendments expanding the scope 
of disabilities covered under the ADA could have the perverse effect of 
decreasing employers’ obligations to pregnant employees. This Article 
argues that these decisions misinterpret the PDA. The same treatment 
* Copyright © 2013 Deborah A. Widiss, Associate Professor, Indiana University
Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to Kerry Abrams, Dina Bakst, Kevin Barry, Mary 
Anne Case, Jeannette Cox, Deborah Dinner, Katie Eyer, Cary Franklin, Joanna 
Grossman, Anita Krishnakumar, Leandra Lederman, Maggie Lemos, Emily Martin, Bill 
Popkin, Victor Quintanilla, Ryan Scott, Charlie Sullivan, Michelle Travis, Liz Watkins, 
Noah Zatz, and participants in a UCLA Faculty Colloquium; 2012 Feminist Legal 
Theory Collaborative Research Network Conference; 2012 Labor & Employment 
Colloquium; 2012 Big 10 Untenured Conference; and the Maurer School of Law 
Junior Faculty Brown-Bag Series for conversations about the ideas that became this 
Article and for insightful suggestions on earlier drafts. Matthew Pfaff provided 
excellent research assistance. Thanks to Interim Dean Hannah Buxbaum and the 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law Summer Research Stipend Program for 
support of this work. My thanks, as well, to the editors at the UC Davis Law Review 
for their extremely conscientious work. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221332
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clause creates a substantive, albeit comparative, accommodation mandate. 
Rather than focusing on the presence or absence of discriminatory intent, 
courts should simply assess whether the employer has accommodated, or 
under the ADA would be required to accommodate, limitations like those 
caused by pregnancy. This approach appropriately incorporates 
consideration of the costs that accommodations impose on employers but 
insulates that inquiry from still prevalent misconceptions regarding 
pregnant women’s capacity and commitment to work. 
This Article is the first to consider in depth how the 2008 amendments to 
the ADA interact with the PDA. In addition to providing textual analysis, 
the Article provides historical context that helps confirm that the PDA 
means what it says. Commentary on the PDA generally characterizes the 
statute’s same treatment language as a response to some feminists’ concerns 
that requiring “special” accommodations for pregnancy would increase the 
risk of discrimination or backlash against women generally. This Article 
contributes to the historical literature on the PDA by identifying a distinct 
— complementary but largely overlooked — benefit of the PDA’s same 
treatment language: it came on the heels of an extraordinary expansion of 
employer and government support for health conditions other than 
pregnancy. Thus, although the PDA does not itself require specific 
pregnancy accommodations, its enactment required many employers to 
provide far more robust support for pregnancy than they had previously. 
This historical context has direct relevance for contemporary doctrine since 
it is closely analogous to the recent expansion of the ADA. The unduly 
narrow conception of comparators currently used by some courts 
interpreting the PDA risks relegating pregnancy once again to the basement. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 963 
 I. PREGNANCY AND WORK ........................................................... 970 
 II. LEGISLATING PREGNANCY ........................................................ 978 
A. (Overbroad) Sex Classifications ........................................ 979 
B. (Underinclusive) Disability Classifications ........................ 984 
C. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Pregnancy As Sex 
and Disability .................................................................... 989 
D. Pregnancy Preferences? ..................................................... 998 
 III. REALIZING THE PDA’S ACCOMMODATION MANDATE .............. 1004 
A. Non-PDA Accommodation Rights .................................... 1005 
B. Adverse Employment Actions Based on Pregnancy ........... 1011 
C. PDA Accommodation Claims ........................................... 1018 
D. Reconceptualizing Accommodation Claims ...................... 1025 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................... 1035 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
2013] Gilbert Redux 963 
INTRODUCTION 
Pregnancy — a health condition that only affects women — raises 
complicated questions regarding the interaction of employment 
policies addressing sex discrimination and those addressing disability. 
Pregnancy, and motherhood more generally, was once a primary 
justification for laws limiting all women’s employment rights. These 
laws relied upon overbroad stereotypes regarding women’s physical 
weakness and normative judgments regarding women’s proper sphere, 
and the lingering effects of such bias remain potent even today.1 At the 
same time, although general assumptions of incapacity are clearly 
unwarranted, pregnancy can cause real physical effects that standard 
workplace policies may fail to accommodate adequately. In this 
respect, pregnancy is like other health conditions that may interfere 
with work. Until the 1970s, however, public and private policies that 
provided health insurance, sick days, and benefits for employees with 
illnesses or injuries routinely excluded “normal” pregnancies.2 In 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court (in)famously held 
that this practice did not constitute sex discrimination.3 Congress 
disagreed. It quickly superseded Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (“PDA”).4 The PDA amends federal employment 
discrimination law to make clear that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy is a form of discrimination “on the basis of sex” and to 
mandate that “women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the 
same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons . . . 
similar in their ability or inability to work.”5 Despite the clarity of this 
language, courts routinely permit employers to treat pregnant 
employees less favorably than employees with other health conditions. 
The pregnancy exception persists. 
The problem stems from determining who “counts” as a comparator 
for PDA analysis. Several circuits have held that employees who 
receive light duty assignments after workplace injuries cannot be used 
 
 1 See infra Parts I, II.A. 
 2 See infra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 3 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding exclusion of pregnancy from disability 
policy did not violate Title VII), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); 
see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding exclusion of pregnancy from 
disability policy did not violate Equal Protection Clause). 
 4 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2012)). 
 5 Id. 
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as comparators for PDA analysis.6 More recently, a handful of courts 
have suggested that employees accommodated pursuant to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) are also not appropriate 
comparators for PDA analysis.7 Courts characterize such policies as 
“pregnancy-blind”; they then conclude that so long as the employer 
applies such policies without any animus against pregnant employees, 
the PDA has not been violated.8 This has long been a simmering 
problem, but, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) has recognized, it has gained new urgency because the ADA 
was recently amended to dramatically expand the range of disabilities 
that statute covers.9 Pursuant to changes made by the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, the ADA’s statutory language and 
accompanying regulations now make clear that employers generally 
must make reasonable accommodations for impairments that 
substantially limit an individual’s ability to lift, walk, stand, or bend 
even on a relatively short-term basis.10 This is undoubtedly an important 
step forward in disability policy. However, the reasoning in these PDA 
cases suggests that the expansion of ADA rights could have the 
perverse effect of decreasing employers’ obligations to pregnant 
 
 6 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 11–2078, 2013 WL 93132, at *7-9 
(4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 
(7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1998). But see Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 
100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (suggesting light duty employees are proper 
comparators at least for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination). 
 7 See Young, 2013 WL 93132, at *7-10; Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, No. 
2:08-CV-4, 2010 WL 1568606, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d, 656 F.3d 540 
(7th Cir. 2011).  
 8 See, e.g., Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641-42 (“Swift’s light-duty policy is indisputably 
pregnancy-blind. . . . Consequently, Reeves cannot avoid summary judgment . . . 
unless a rational juror could find that ‘the employer intended to discriminate against 
the protected group.’”) (citation omitted). 
 9 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADA Amendments 
Act), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The EEOC’s strategic enforcement 
plan adopted in December 2012 identifies “accommodating pregnancy-related 
limitations under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) and 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)” as a priority area for enforcement because it 
is an “emerging and developing issue.” EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN, FY 2013-
2016, at 10 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf. 
 10 ADA Amendments Act, § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012)) (listing 
illustrative major life activities and instructing that the definition of disability be 
construed “in favor of broad coverage”); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) & (j) (2012) (expanding 
on these principles and stating that “the effects of an impairment lasting or expected 
to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this 
section”); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2012) (similar). 
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employees by reducing significantly the pool of potential comparators 
considered under a PDA claim.11 
This Article argues that this body of PDA case law misinterprets the 
statute’s same treatment language. The PDA explicitly provides that 
treating pregnant employees — by definition, only women — less 
favorably than other employees with health conditions that similarly 
affect the ability to work is itself a form of sex discrimination. In this 
respect, PDA claims that are premised on the statute’s comparative 
language and that allege a failure to make accommodations differ from 
standard claims of intentional employment discrimination. The PDA’s 
plain language makes clear that it should not matter why an employer 
accommodates an employee who has limited ability to work. Rather, it 
should simply matter whether the employer has done so. The PDA’s 
same treatment clause thus should be understood to create a 
substantive, albeit comparative, accommodation mandate. This 
approach appropriately incorporates consideration of the costs that 
accommodations impose on employers, while effectively insulating 
this analysis from still prevalent misconceptions regarding pregnant 
women’s capacity and commitment to work. 
This Article is the first to examine in detail how the recent 
amendments to the ADA interact with the PDA.12 In addition to 
 
 11 If pregnancy substantially limits an employee’s ability to lift, walk, stand, or 
conduct other “major life activities,” the pregnant employee might argue that 
pregnancy itself can qualify as a disability. See generally Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as 
“Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443 (2012) 
(exploring these arguments in detail). The EEOC, however, has drawn a bright-line 
distinction between “normal” pregnancies, which it contends are never disabilities 
even if they cause such limitations, and pregnancy complications, which it contends 
may be. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (“[C]onditions, such as pregnancy, 
that are not the result of a physiological disorder are . . . not impairments [and 
accordingly not disabilities]. However, a pregnancy-related impairment that 
substantially limits a major-life activity is a disability under the first prong of the 
definition.”). I believe Professor Cox makes strong arguments against this distinction 
and more generally critiquing any cultural resistance to labeling pregnancy as a 
disability. See Cox, supra, at 480-86 (arguing that pregnancy fits within a social model 
of disability and that it may be covered under the ADA because the statutory 
definition of disability encompasses both “disorders” and “conditions”). That said, one 
virtue of relying on the PDA’s same treatment clause is that it permits courts to 
sidestep the thorny issue of whether pregnancy is itself a disability. 
 12 Of course, I build on the work of other scholars and advocates. Shortly after the 
ADA was enacted, Deborah Calloway argued that employers would need to 
accommodate pregnancy to the same extent that they accommodated ADA-qualifying 
disabilities. See Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 
STETSON L. REV. 1, 27-33 (1994). Courts interpreted the original ADA so narrowly that 
this approach was little explored. Now that the ADA Amendments Act makes it salient 
once again, experts testifying to the EEOC on pregnancy discrimination suggested that 
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textual analysis, it provides historical context that helps confirm the 
PDA means what it says. The PDA was a rather elegant response to a 
longstanding disagreement within the feminist movement that is 
usually characterized as the “special treatment/equal treatment” 
debate.13 The “special treatment” position began from the premise that 
workplaces were typically designed to meet the needs of men rather 
than women and that women’s biologically-determined role in 
reproduction should be accommodated to ensure equal opportunity. 
For example, proponents argued that guaranteed maternity leave was 
necessary so that both women and men could maintain paid 
employment while having children.14 The “equal treatment” position, 
 
the EEOC adopt an approach along the lines that I propose. See Emily Martin, Vice 
President and General Counsel, Nat’l Women’s Law Center, Written Testimony at 
EEOC Meeting on Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers 
with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/martin.cfm; Joan C. Williams, Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Cal. Hastings, and Director, Ctr. for Worklife Law, Written 
Testimony at EEOC Meeting on Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers 
and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/williams.cfm; see also Joan C. Williams, 
Accommodations for Pregnancy-Related Conditions Under the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (Univ. of California, Hasting Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 12, Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2155817) [hereinafter Accommodations for Pregnancy-Related 
Conditions] (discussing arguments that the scope of protections under the PDA “has 
grown along with the expansion of the ADA,” as well as the possibility of bringing 
claims directly under the amended ADA). Jeannette Cox’s article arguing that 
pregnancy should itself be recognized as a disability under the amended ADA also 
touches on the ADA-PDA interaction and argues for an interpretation similar to that 
which I advocate. See Cox, supra note 11, at 467-73. And Joanna Grossman and 
Gillian Thomas have made nuanced and detailed critiques of the analysis in the light 
duty cases that helped inform my doctrinal analysis of the PDA’s comparative clause. 
See Joanna Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 567, 614-15 (2010); Joanna Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy 
Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 39-41 (2009).  
 13 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the 
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142-63 (1986) 
(summarizing and critiquing the debate); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: 
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-70 (1984) [hereinafter Equality’s Riddle] (discussing the debate 
and ultimately arguing that the equal treatment approach is preferable).  
 14 See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/ 
facpubs/386 (generally supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); Linda J. Krieger & 
Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action, and 
the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/1 (same); Christine A. Littleton, 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
2013] Gilbert Redux 967 
by contrast, argued that employment policy should not distinguish 
between women and men. Advocates in this camp were concerned 
that even policies that were designed to be beneficial, such as 
mandated maternity leave, were ultimately counterproductive because 
they reinforced stereotypes that women were less capable than men or 
less committed to work than men.15 Commentary that situates the 
PDA within this debate generally characterizes its same treatment 
language as reflecting and responding primarily to the concerns voiced 
by equal treatment advocates.16 
This Article contributes to the historical literature on the PDA by 
demonstrating a distinct — complementary but largely overlooked — 
benefit of the PDA’s structure: it was enacted following a period in 
which employers dramatically increased support for health conditions 
other than pregnancy.17 This growth, due to a combination of policies 
voluntarily adopted by private employers and statutory mandates 
regarding workplace injuries and disabilities, was truly stunning. 
Thus, although the PDA did not itself require specific pregnancy 
accommodations, its directive that pregnancy be treated “the same” as 
other health conditions required many employers to provide far more 
robust support for pregnancy than they had previously. In this respect, 
the same treatment mandate simultaneously responds to the concerns 
of both “equal treatment” and “special treatment” advocates. And, 
crucially important, such “leveling up” was required even if an 
employer’s exclusion of pregnancy from disability, health insurance, 
 
Equality and Feminist Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043 (1987) (same); cf. Samuel 
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the 
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2214-20 (proposing an insurance 
system for pregnancy leave). 
 15 See, e.g., Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra note 13, at 352-64 (presenting the 
argument in defense of “equal treatment”); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the 
Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1974), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol62/iss5/4 (discussing 
dangers of reliance on damaging and overbroad sex-based stereotypes when pregnancy 
is treated as a “unique” condition).  
 16 See, e.g., David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 51, 127 (2011) (“The PDA adopts an equal treatment approach to 
pregnancy. . . .”); Kevin S. Schwartz, Equalizing Pregnancy: The Birth of a Super-
Statute 20-28 (May 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/41/ (similar). Notably, however, 
other recent work has sought to complicate the accepted narrative of the debate. See, 
e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of 
Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 444-47, 449-57 (2011) (arguing that the 
debate should be reconceptualized as a disagreement regarding what interim strategies 
were most likely to succeed in advancing shared objectives). 
 17 See infra Part II.B.  
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sick day, or other policies was due to pregnancy-neutral factors, such 
as minimizing costs or compliance with other statutory mandates, 
rather than animus or bias. Accordingly, it was well understood that 
the PDA would require employers provide additional support for 
pregnancy and that this would impose costs on employers.18 
This historical context, which establishes that a primary purpose of 
the PDA was addressing the exclusion of pregnancy from then-
recently-expanded public and private disability policies, is important 
for considering how the PDA interacts with the ADA. It bolsters the 
argument that ADA-accommodated employees are appropriate 
comparators for PDA analysis, as well as that pregnancy itself is 
properly classified as a disability under the ADA. This approach 
permits courts to effectively “harmonize” the PDA and the ADA, 
complying with their “duty” to make each statute “effective.”19 By 
contrast, when courts hold that ADA-accommodated employees are 
not proper comparators for PDA analysis, they functionally erase the 
PDA’s same-treatment language, which constitutes a “repeal by 
implication” that is highly “disfavored.”20 In a case decided shortly 
after the PDA was enacted, the Supreme Court famously declared that 
the PDA set a floor, not a ceiling, on employers’ obligations.21 The 
ADA and the ADA Amendments Act raised the floor for treatment of 
other disabilities. The blinkered approach some courts use in 
interpreting the comparative language in the PDA risks relegating 
pregnancy once again to the basement. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the ways in which 
pregnancy can affect work and the crucial importance of women’s 
wages to households. It shows that pregnant employees may need both 
protection from adverse actions based on their condition and 
accommodations at work. Part II situates the PDA within a 
longstanding debate over how best to advance women’s equality. It 
builds a historical record to demonstrate the PDA was intended to 
ensure that pregnancy receives the same level of employer support as 
other health conditions that interfere with work, even if the exclusion 
 
 18 See infra Part II.C. The PDA also provided explicitly that employers could not 
reduce the level of benefits provided during a one year transition program. See 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 3, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
 19 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“The courts are not at liberty to 
pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable 
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional 
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”) 
 20 Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 416 (1994); see also, e.g., Cook County v. United 
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003). 
 21 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987).  
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is due to cost-based reasons or other statutory mandates rather than 
discriminatory animus. Part III focuses on current doctrine, arguing 
that courts therefore err when they assume the PDA only addresses 
biased treatment and that the standard burden-shifting approach used 
in intentional discrimination cases should not be used in cases alleging 
a failure to accommodate. This Part articulates a proposal for 
reconceptualizing accommodation claims to focus instead on the 
simple question of whether an employer has accommodated, or under 
the ADA would be required to accommodate, limitations like those 
caused by pregnancy. 
A few final introductory thoughts: In considering the challenge of 
accommodating pregnancy within the workplace, I have chosen (for 
this project at least) to work within existing legal frameworks rather 
than imagine an ideal solution. I write in the hope that the analysis 
that follows can help women receive the support they need to work 
safely and productively through a pregnancy. That said, relying on the 
PDA has limitations. First, while I argue that the PDA’s 
accommodation mandate is more robust than typically understood, it 
remains comparative. The PDA thus provides less recourse to pregnant 
women than recently-proposed bills that would explicitly grant 
pregnant employees a right to reasonable accommodations.22 Second 
(and this is a concern that perhaps pulls in the opposite direction), 
framing the need for modifications at work as “accommodations” 
obscures the extent to which “standard” workplace structures are 
themselves socially-constructed and deeply gendered.23 As reformers 
recognized in the debates over the PDA, if support for pregnancy is 
perceived as “special treatment,” it could increase other forms of sex 
discrimination or harassment. With these concerns in mind, the 
Conclusion briefly discusses how the pregnancy accommodation story 
hints at an alternative path to reform: the successful universalization 
of other provisions that were once “special treatment” for women — 
minimum wage, mandatory breaks, and overtime — into basic 
workplace entitlements. This is a helpful reminder that enactment of 
broad-based labor standards can establish new baselines of “normal” 
workplace practices. Perhaps in the future more general changes will 
be made that address not only the physical needs of pregnancy, but 
 
 22 Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. (2012); Pregnant 
Workers Fairness Act, S. 3565, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 23 See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 
1112-24 (showing how the forty-hour five-day workweek became the standard for 
wage labor and how such wage work, typically performed by men, became defined in 
opposition to labor, typically performed by women, that took place within the home). 
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also the larger challenges faced by both men and women struggling to 
balance work and family responsibilities.24 
I. PREGNANCY AND WORK 
It was once widely believed that women could — and should — 
stop working when they became pregnant. Husbands were expected to 
shoulder breadwinning responsibilities during their wives’ pregnancy 
and the years of child raising that followed.25 That assumption was 
always inaccurate as a positive statement and unduly limiting as a 
normative principle. Now it is patently unrealistic. Women currently 
make up 47% of the workforce in the United States, and most 
pregnant women and their families depend on their earnings.26 
First, the assumption that a pregnant woman has a husband who 
can provide income is often incorrect. Even as long ago as 1980, 18% 
of all births in the United States were to single women; in 2009, 41% 
of all births were to single women.27 Although unmarried women may 
be able to claim child support, they generally have no legal claim for 
support for their own needs, other than some direct medical expenses, 
during a pregnancy or after a birth.28 Women who do not have a 
college degree are more likely than more highly-educated women to 
 
 24 The ongoing salience of these questions is well illustrated by Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s recent article proclaiming “women still can’t have it all” and the firestorm 
of media attention and debate it initiated. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why 
Women Still Can’t Have It All, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2012; Editorial Staff, The 
Atlantic’s ‘Women can’t have it all’ manifesto: The backlash, THE WEEK, June 26, 2012, 
available at http://theweek.com/article/index/229808/the-atlantics-women-cant-have-
it-all-manifesto-the-backlash. 
 25 See, e.g., Albiston, supra note 23, at 1118-20 (describing how the separate 
spheres ideology, pastoralization of the home, and family wage ideal worked together 
to define work for women as “at most . . . a short transition period from childhood to 
marriage”).  
 26 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A 
DATABOOK, 28-38 tbl. 11 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 DATABOOK], available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf.  
 27 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., Births: Final Data for 2009, 60 NAT’L VITAL 
STATS. REPORTS 1, 8 tbl. C (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf. Teenagers accounted for just 21% of nonmarital births, 
down from 29% of all nonmarital births ten years earlier. Id. at 8. This figure may also 
include some women in same-sex marriages, since such marriages are not recognized 
for purposes of federal law.  
 28 Cf. Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that support 
obligation should be created). Of course, a man who impregnates a woman may 
choose to provide her financial assistance.  
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be unmarried when pregnant;29 they are also more likely to work for 
low wages and lack any access to paid leave for pregnancy or 
childbirth.30 Women who are married also generally need to continue 
to earn income during pregnancy. On average, working wives 
contribute 37% of family income31 and, in 2009, 38% of wives earned 
more than their husbands.32 Wives are the sole earner in 
approximately 6% of marriages (husbands are the sole earner in 
approximately 18% of marriages).33 The prevalence of nonmarital 
births and growing number of married women who out-earn their 
husbands means that the mother is the primary or sole earner in 
nearly 40% of all households.34 
Given the importance of women’s wage earning, it is not surprising 
that many women now work late into a pregnancy. In the early 1960s, 
only 35% of first-time mothers worked during the last month of their 
pregnancy; by contrast, 82% of those who gave birth between 2006 
and 2008 worked during the last month of their pregnancy.35 As 
described more fully in the sections that follow, these numbers, and 
their dramatic shift, do not necessarily demonstrate a fully 
endogenous change in women’s desires. The first time period predates 
legal protections against pregnancy discrimination; at that time, it was 
common for employers in certain industries to require women to stop 
working as a pregnancy advanced.36 Even now, some women who 
 
 29 E.g., Jennifer Manlove et al., The Relationship Context of Nonmarital Childbearing 
in the U.S., 23 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 615, 619-20 (2010). 
 30 See, e.g., 2011 DATABOOK, supra note 26, at 53-54, tbl. 17 (showing positive 
correlation between amount of education and wages); STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, CENTER 
FOR WORKLIFE LAW, POOR, PREGNANT, AND FIRED: CAREGIVER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
LOW-WAGE WORKERS 5-7 (2011) (noting that most low-wage workers do not receive 
paid sick days or paid or unpaid family or medical leave). 
 31 2011 DATABOOK, supra note 26, at 77, tbl. 24. Some estimates are higher. For 
example, a recent study found that in 2009, employed wives contributed 47% of total 
family earnings. KRISTIN SMITH, CARSEY INST., WIVES AS BREADWINNERS: WIVES’ SHARE OF 
FAMILY EARNINGS HITS HISTORIC HIGH DURING SECOND YEAR OF THE GREAT RECESSION 
(Fall 2010), available at http://www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-Smith-
Breadwinners10.pdf. 
 32 2011 DATABOOK, supra note 26, at tbl. 25.  
 33 Id. at tbl. 23.  
 34 Heather Boushey, The New Breadwinners, in A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES 
EVERYTHING 31, 36 (Heather Boushey & Ann O’Leary eds., 2009). 
 35 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Maternity Leave and Employment 
Patterns of First-Time Mothers 1961-2008 (2011), at 6 [hereinafter Maternity Leave and 
Employment].  
 36 See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE 
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 74-75, 127 (2004) (discussing how 
school districts and airlines often fired women when they got pregnant, regardless of 
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would like to work late into their pregnancies may not be able to 
because of inflexible employment policies or unlawful pregnancy 
discrimination.37 Many women also return to work relatively quickly 
after giving birth,38 and significant majorities of both married and 
unmarried mothers engage in paid work while raising children.39 
For both married and unmarried pregnant employees, losing a job 
or being forced onto unpaid leave during pregnancy is likely to cause 
significant economic hardship. This is compounded by the fact that 
the United States is one of the very few countries in the world (the 
others are Swaziland and Papua New Guinea) that do not guarantee 
paid maternity leave.40 Additionally, as discussed more fully below, 
even employees who have paid leave may exhaust their benefits if 
forced onto leave during pregnancy and thus lack any income, or a job 
to return to, during any period that they wish to remain at home after 
childbirth. 
Pregnant employees may face two distinct, but sometimes 
interrelated, challenges. The first is what is classically recognized as 
“discrimination”: that is, adverse employment actions — such as 
failure to hire or termination — motivated by the employee’s 
pregnancy. While Title VII, as amended by the PDA, clearly makes 
such actions illegal, discrimination against pregnant workers persists.41 
Indeed, particularly in low-wage workplaces, it is still common to fire 
 
job performance). Title VII was enacted in 1964 but its key substantive provisions did 
not take effect until 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964).  
 37 See infra text accompanying notes 41-45.  
 38 U.S. Census Bureau, Maternity Leave and Employment, supra note 35, at 14 
(stating that of women who work during their first pregnancy, 73% return to work 
within six months of the birth of a child). 
 39 2011 DATABOOK, supra note 26, at tbl. 6 (showing 62.5% of married mothers 
and 68.2% of never-married, divorced, separated, and widowed mothers with children 
under six engage in paid work, and that the respective numbers rise to 76% and 80% 
for mothers with children ages six to seventeen). 
 40 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND WORK-
FAMILY SUPPORTS IN THE U.S. 33 (2011). For a detailed (but now slightly outdated) 
compendium of maternity leave policies worldwide, see U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2010: TRENDS AND STATISTICS 103-05 & tbl. 4-D 
(2010). A rapidly growing number of countries guarantee at least some paid paternity 
leave as well. See id.  
 41 In the past ten years, the EEOC and local fair employment agencies received 
53,865 charges alleging pregnancy discrimination, and the EEOC obtained $150.5 
million in benefits for charging parties. Peggy Mastroianni, Legal Counsel, EEOC, 
Written Testimony at EEOC Meeting on Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant 
Workers and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/mastroianni.cfm.  
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employees immediately after they announce pregnancies.42 Other 
discrimination is more subtle. Sociological studies demonstrate that 
pregnant women are perceived to be less capable than other workers.43 
Such biases may result in pregnant workers being judged to have 
failed to perform adequately, leading to refusal to promote, corrective 
action, or termination. The EEOC has identified pregnancy 
discrimination as a priority area.44 It has pursued cases alleging bias 
against pregnant employees in large companies such as Bloomberg 
News, Verizon, and (somewhat ironically) maternity-clothes giant 
Motherhood Maternity, and several have resulted in sizeable 
settlements.45 
The second challenge that pregnant employees may face is a need to 
request an accommodation — that is, a modification of standard 
workplace procedures in the employee’s favor — that would facilitate 
working through a pregnancy. Importantly, some workers may not 
require any employer accommodation at all. Others may be able to 
change their work habits (e.g., take more frequent restroom breaks) 
without asking their employer, or even conceptualizing such changes 
as workplace “accommodations.” But for some women, either the 
nature of their work environment or the nature of their pregnancy 
may require that they affirmatively request that their employer change 
standard work requirements.46 
The necessary changes may be quite minor. For example, an 
employee may need a uniform modified to accommodate her changing 
body,47 or permission to take extra restroom breaks or to carry a water 
 
 42 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 11-14; see also Williams, EEOC Testimony, 
supra note 12 (describing women in a variety of jobs who were — shockingly! — 
pressured to have abortions or risk losing their jobs).  
 43 See, e.g., Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance 
Appraisals, 14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 649, 652-53 (1993); see also Stephen Benard 
et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1368-72 
(2008) (collecting and discussing other studies finding pregnancy bias). 
 44 Christina Wilkie, Pregnancy Discrimination In the Workplace Target of New EEOC 
Crackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/09/29/pregnancy-discrimination-eeoc_n_1924603.html. 
 45 Press Release, EEOC, Class of Women to Receive $48.9 million in EEOC-
Verizon Pregnancy Bias Settlement (June 5, 2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/newsroom/release/6-05-06a.cfm; Press Release, EEOC, Maternity Store Giant to 
Pay $375,000 to Settle EEOC Pregnancy Discrimination and Retaliation Lawsuit (Jan. 
8, 2007), available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-8-07.cfm.  
 46 For a detailed discussion of physical changes caused by pregnancy and their 
relationship to work, see, e.g., Calloway, supra note 12, at 3-16; Grossman, supra note 
12, at 578-84. 
 47 See Williams, Accommodations for Pregnancy-Related Conditions, supra note 12 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
974 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:961 
bottle so that she can drink outside regular break times.48 An 
employee whose job requires standing for long periods of time may 
need a stool.49 Employees whose work occasionally — but not 
regularly — requires lifting heavy objects may need to be excused 
from, or helped with, such obligations.50 Employees may seek to limit 
overtime, or avoid night work.51 Other modifications may be more 
substantial. Employees in jobs that regularly require lifting heavy 
loads or significant physical exertion may seek a transfer to a different 
position,52 or the regular assignment of an additional employee to 
provide assistance.53 Employees may seek to limit their exposure to 
potentially harmful toxins or chemicals.54 Although undoubtedly 
many employers readily accommodate such needs, published court 
cases and records of complaints make clear that others do not. This 
may be particularly true in low-wage highly-regulated work 
environments.55 Denial of such requests may be due to bias, but it may 
 
(describing call from pregnant employee required to take FMLA leave when she could 
no longer wear her uniform, even though she had no other physical limitations that 
interfered with her ability to work). 
 48 See, e.g., Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at 
*1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009) (pregnant employee with urinary and bladder infections 
fired when her employer prohibited her from carrying a water bottle as recommended 
by her doctor).  
 49 See, e.g., Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(pregnant postal worker instructed by doctor to stand no more than four hours was 
refused use of chair and was forced to go to part-time schedule). 
 50 See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4, 2010 WL 
1568606, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(pregnant director of activities for nursing home instructed by doctor to avoid lifting 
heavy weights was denied assistance with responsibilities that took only five to ten 
minutes per day).  
 51 See, e.g., EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 946 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (pregnant secretary fired because, on the advice of her doctor, she refused 
to work overtime). Some studies suggest that night work may heighten risk of 
miscarriage. See Grossman, supra note 12, at 583 n.79 (citing conflicting studies). 
 52 See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (pregnant 
airline ticketing agent instructed by doctor to avoid heavy lifting denied transfer to 
service center agent position which did not require lifting luggage).  
 53 See, e.g., Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distrib. Co., 156 Fed. Appx. 880, 882 (8th Cir. 
2005) (pregnant truck driver denied request to transfer to light duty position or have 
assistant accompany her on route to assist with heavy lifting). 
 54 See Calloway, supra note 12, at 11-14 (discussing numerous chemicals common 
in workplaces that may present significant risks for fetal health).  
 55 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 14-17; see also Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave 
Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7-8 (2007) 
(collecting studies showing low-wage workers have less access to paid and unpaid 
leave than higher paid workers). 
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also stem from pregnancy-neutral factors such as a desire to avoid any 
additional costs. 
Additionally, virtually every pregnant employee needs to take some 
time off from work for labor, delivery, and recovery; earlier in the 
pregnancy, she may need time off for prenatal appointments, which 
can be difficult to schedule outside of regular business hours. Medical 
experts typically agree that women should plan to take four to eight 
weeks off to recover from a vaginal delivery, and longer if the birth 
was by cesarean section or if there were other complications.56 This 
time is necessary to address the woman’s own health needs, 
independent from the need for infant care, although typically post-
partum mothers do both simultaneously. As discussed below, women 
who work for relatively large employers, and who satisfy length-of-
service requirements, have a right to up to twelve weeks off for 
pregnancy and infant care under the federal Family and Medical Leave 
Act (“FMLA”).57 Many smaller employers likewise provide such leave 
as a matter of standard practice. But if an employee works for an 
employer with a no-leave policy, or does not satisfy all the 
requirements of any available policy, such time off is properly framed 
as a necessary accommodation as well. 
“Accommodations” thus can include two distinct categories: (1) 
changes at work that make it possible to continue working safely 
throughout a pregnancy; and (2) job-protected leave from work, ideally 
with continuation of benefits and pay or other income replacement, 
for the period of time during pregnancy, childbirth, and recovery from 
childbirth that a woman is unable to work. They are interrelated, in 
that denial of modifications at work can expand the period of time that 
a woman cannot work. To see this, imagine a woman who is told by 
her doctor to avoid lifting more than twenty-five pounds. If that 
restriction is accommodated at work (e.g., a coworker helps move 
heavy objects) the woman will be able to work through her pregnancy 
and will need a relatively short time away from work for childbirth 
and recovery. If, however, the lifting restriction is not accommodated, 
the woman may need to stop working early in her pregnancy or 
increase the risk of harm to herself or to the fetus she is carrying. 
Now consider the two issues — that is, adverse actions against an 
employee and denial of accommodations — more generally. They are 
distinct challenges. An employee who is perfectly capable of doing her 
 
 56 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 & n.4 (2003). 
That said, women in relatively sedentary jobs might be able to perform their work 
tasks soon after giving birth, particularly if they can work remotely.  
 57 See infra text accompanying notes 190-193.  
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job without any modification may find herself fired because of 
unwarranted assumptions that pregnancy interferes with her ability to 
work. Or an employer who has no problem with women working 
through their pregnancies may be unwilling to incur costs associated 
with accommodations. At times, however, the challenges interrelate. 
For at least some employers, reluctance to make even minor 
modifications may be motivated by unjustified assumptions that 
pregnant workers are less capable than other workers or unlikely to 
return after childbirth. And, of course, denial of accommodations may 
in turn lead to an adverse action against an employee if the result of 
the denial is that the employee cannot meet the standard job 
requirements. 
The relationship may run in reverse, as well. Mandating employers 
provide accommodations for pregnancy may increase discrimination at 
the hiring stage against pregnant women or against all women of 
childbearing age. It may also increase the likelihood that a woman will 
be fired shortly before she otherwise would access benefits such as a 
paid maternity leave. Most accommodation mandates are accompanied 
by antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation provisions that are intended 
to preclude such discrimination. If laws were always perfectly 
enforced, this would be sufficient; in the real world, however, 
increased discrimination is a legitimate concern. For example, the 
president of the influential Merchants and Manufacturers Association 
was unusually honest in his response to a Supreme Court decision 
upholding a state law that mandated up to four months of disability 
leave for pregnancy and childbirth: He stated bluntly that it would 
mean “[m]any employers will be prone to discriminate against women 
in hiring and hire males instead.” When the interviewer pointed out 
that this would be illegal, the manufacturing executive responded, 
“[T]ry to prove it.”58 
Accordingly, the challenge for making policy in this area is that the 
natural response to these dual concerns may pull in different 
directions. To counter bias against pregnant employees, advocates 
typically want to emphasize that pregnant women remain competent 
employees and that employers should ignore pregnancy, just as they 
should (usually) ignore race, religion, or national origin. At the same 
time, to receive accommodations, advocates must acknowledge that 
pregnancy sometimes does interfere with work. This highlights 
 
 58 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1346 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recounting National Public Radio interview of Don Butler 
by Nina Totenberg).  
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pregnancy as a potentially salient condition that employers must 
consider. 
As described more fully in the Parts that follow, the PDA addresses 
both the need to protect employees from adverse actions stemming 
from animus or bias and the need to provide accommodations. It does 
so by defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
and related medical conditions as a form of sex discrimination, and by 
separately and affirmatively mandating that employers accommodate 
pregnancy (at least) to the extent they accommodate other conditions 
that cause similar limitations. As discussed in Part III, courts err when 
they conflate the analysis required by these distinct provisions. 
That said, courts’ under-enforcement of the accommodation 
mandate may reflect a perceived tension between it and the more 
general prohibition on biased behavior. In this respect, it is essential to 
understand that institutional norms regarding work generally 
determine the extent to which any given woman needs modifications 
at work. For example, if American law did not permit mandatory 
overtime, a pregnant (or any other) employee who did not want to 
work more than forty hours would not need to be specifically excused 
from overtime responsibilities — she would simply decline to 
volunteer for extra hours. Similarly, if employers routinely provided 
stools for employees who are required to stand in a place for many 
hours (a policy that both male and female employees would certainly 
appreciate), pregnant employees would not need to request a seat as 
an “accommodation.” 
These examples illustrate the more general theoretical point that, in 
many instances, failure to make an accommodation can be 
characterized as a form of discrimination. American workplaces are 
usually designed to meet the needs of a “typical” male, white, 
Christian, English-speaking, able-bodied worker who has a partner 
who will take care of domestic needs. Accordingly, even in the absence 
of discriminatory intent, the structures of the workplace may exclude 
employees who differ from this “typical” or “ideal” worker.59 This is 
the central insight of substantive equality theory, as well as a primary 
justification for statutory disparate impact doctrine60 and for explicit 
 
 59 See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 62-113 (2000) (describing development of a gendered 
“ideal worker” norm); Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons for 
Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 181-88 
(2002) (developing a metaphor of a “tilted” baseline and arguing reasonable 
accommodation provisions are best conceptualized as means to rectify the tilt). 
 60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
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mandates that employers make “reasonable accommodations” for 
religion and disability.61 In fact, even standard disparate treatment 
doctrine bars so-called “rational discrimination” based on true 
generalizations about groups, thereby prohibiting conduct based on 
legitimate cost-concerns rather than animus.62 Thus, several theorists 
have argued persuasively that antidiscrimination and accommodation 
mandates are better understood as overlapping concepts than as 
distinct and fundamentally different.63 The PDA provides fertile 
ground for exploring this theoretical debate. Its second clause 
operationalizes the intuition that a failure to make an accommodation 
— that is, if the employer has accommodated other employees with 
comparable limitations — can be a form of discrimination “because of 
sex.” Recent judicial decisions, however, have robbed the comparative 
language of the force it should have. The result is that pregnant 
employees are denied accommodations that they need and that the 
law, properly interpreted, grants them. 
II. LEGISLATING PREGNANCY 
In the first half of the twentieth century, it was common and legal 
for employers to fire pregnant employees, even as pregnancy and 
maternal caretaking responsibilities were used to justify a network of 
sex-based “protective” labor legislation that governed many aspects of 
 
 61 Id. §§ 2000e(j), 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
 62 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978) (holding impermissible an employer pension policy that required women to 
make larger contributions than men to reflect differences in life span); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) 
Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (discussing forms of “rational” discrimination 
and their similarities to accommodation mandates).  
 63 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642 (2001) (demonstrating economic effects of accommodation and 
antidiscrimination provisions, particularly disparate impact, are essentially the same); 
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (arguing that accommodations are 
consistent with other antidiscrimination measures that require alteration of 
exclusionary workplace norms); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party 
Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1357 (2009) (arguing third-party harassment doctrine functions as an 
accommodation mandate). But see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, 
Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the 
Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001) (contending 
antidiscrimination and accommodation principles are fundamentally different); 
Stewart J. Schwab & Stephen L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1200-12 (2003) (similar). 
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women’s employment more generally. At the same time, pregnancy 
was routinely left out of a rapidly emerging network of public and 
private workplace policies that provided support for other health 
conditions that could interfere with work. In other words, pregnancy 
was the justification for overbroad sex-based classifications while it 
was excluded from disability classifications. The enactment of Title 
VII, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, called both 
practices into question, and the PDA was ultimately enacted to end 
both practices. 
As discussed more fully in Part III, contemporary courts interpreting 
the PDA focus primarily on the existence or absence of discriminatory 
animus. This Part retraces the history that led to the PDA to argue that 
this approach misinterprets the statute. Rather, the history helps 
confirm the PDA’s plain language mandate: pregnancy must be 
accommodated if other temporarily disabling conditions are 
accommodated, even if an employer’s denial of accommodations is 
based on pregnancy-neutral factors such as limiting costs or 
compliance with other statutory mandates. 
A. (Overbroad) Sex Classifications 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for a 
covered employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin,” as well as to “limit, segregate, or classify [its] 
employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities” because of any of these 
factors.64 As initially introduced, the bill did not include “sex.” Sex 
was added by a representative who was opposed to the law generally, 
and the traditional (though now contested) explanation has been that 
he hoped it would work as a “poison pill.”65 However, several 
members of Congress quickly rallied around the addition, lobbying 
both for its retention and for the passage of the law as a whole.66 
Title VII created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) charged with reviewing employee complaints and issuing 
guidance under the new law. The Commission immediately 
 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 65 See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex 
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 & n.36 (collecting sources discussing 
various explanations for the amendment).  
 66 See id. at 1326-28. 
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recognized that applying the statutory prohibition on sex 
discrimination to pregnancy would be challenging. In its first report to 
Congress, the EEOC stated: 
The prohibition against sex discrimination is especially 
difficult to apply with respect to the female employees who 
become pregnant. In all other questions involving sex 
discrimination, the underlying principle is the essential 
equality of treatment. . . . The pregnant female, however, has 
no analogous male counterpart and pregnancy necessarily 
must be treated uniquely. The Commission decided that to 
carry out the Congressional policy of providing truly equal 
employment opportunities, including career opportunities, for 
women, policies would have to be devised which afforded 
female employees reasonable job protection during periods of 
pregnancy.67 
As Kevin Schwarz details in a careful review of early EEOC opinion 
letters and guidance on pregnancy, the agency initially took an ad hoc 
approach that yielded inconsistent directives. Opinion letters issued by 
the EEOC’s Office of General Counsel in 1966 and 1967 suggested 
that employers’ fringe benefit policies could treat pregnancy less 
generously than other temporary disabilities, although at least one of 
these letters also opined that “to provide substantial equality of 
employment opportunity . . . a leave of absence should be granted for 
pregnancy whether or not it is granted for illness.”68 Within a few 
years, the EEOC’s separate Office of Compliance held that exclusion of 
pregnancy from disability policies violated Title VII, as did denials of 
leave for pregnancy (whether or not comparable leaves were offered 
for other disabilities).69 
These early EEOC documents are external evidence of internal 
debates occurring not just at the EEOC but within a larger group of 
feminists and labor activists.70 This debate is typically referred to as 
the “special treatment/equal treatment” debate, and it embodied many 
of the tensions discussed in Part I between addressing biased decision-
making based on pregnancy and accommodation needs.71 The 
 
 67 EEOC, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1965-66 40 (1967).  
 68 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 12-13 (quoting letters from 1966 and 1967). 
 69 Id. at 17-20 (quoting decisions from 1970-1972). 
 70 See id. at 12-32.  
 71 See generally sources cited supra notes 13-14 (discussing the pros and cons of 
the equal treatment and special treatment approaches, particularly in the context of 
pregnancy-specific benefits). 
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question was whether ending discrimination on the basis of sex 
required that women be treated exactly like men, or whether, at least 
with respect to pregnancy, different “special treatment” was necessary 
to provide women equal opportunity. 
This debate was longstanding. In the late nineteenth century, state 
legislatures began to regulate aspects of employment that had 
previously been entirely subject to negotiation between employees and 
employers. Some of these early laws were sex-neutral; others were 
designed specifically to protect women and children, many of whom 
worked in appalling conditions in sweatshop-like factories.72 The 
Supreme Court soon heard challenges to the constitutionality of such 
provisions. In Lochner v. New York,73 the Court struck down a sex-
neutral regulation on bakers’ hours on the grounds that it interfered 
with freedom of contract. But just three years later, in Muller v. 
Oregon, the Court upheld an Oregon statute that limited women to 
working no more than ten hours per day in certain industries.74 The 
Court reasoned that because it was “obvious” that women’s “physical 
structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a 
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence,” the legislation was 
justified to protect “not merely her own health, but the well-being of 
the race” from the “greed as well as the passion of man.”75 (It is worth 
noting the “protection” provided was limited; many men, as well as 
women, would find it difficult to work more than ten-hour shifts in a 
physically demanding job.) 
In the wake of Muller, states rapidly expanded the network of 
“protective” legislation regulating women’s, but not men’s, 
employment. By the early 1960s, forty-four states had enacted 
maximum hour legislation; the caps were rather high, however, 
generally ranging from forty-eight hours to sixty hours per week.76 
Many had also enacted minimum wage provisions; prohibitions on 
night work; limitations on lifting; requirements that seating, 
washrooms, and restroom facilities be provided; and regular meal 
 
 72 See, e.g., COBBLE, supra note 36, at 95-96; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: 
A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 180-214 (1982). Many 
other countries enacted similar “women protective” legislation during this period. See 
generally PROTECTING WOMEN: LABOR LEGISLATION IN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
AUSTRALIA, 1880-1920 (Ulla Wikander et al. eds., 1995). 
 73 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).  
 74 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  
 75 Id. at 421-22. 
 76 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN: THE REPORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF 
THE COMMISSION 240-41 (1965) [hereinafter PCSW, AMERICAN WOMEN]. 
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periods and rest periods.77 Several also prohibited women from 
working at all in a range of occupations.78 
This body of legislation improved working conditions for many 
women dramatically. But it came with some serious costs. The Court’s 
decision in Muller reinforced stereotypes regarding women’s physical 
weakness and established a constitutional presumption that women’s 
paid work must be subordinated to their duties to home and family 
life for the “well-being of the race.”79 There was also truth in the 
assertion that the laws simply “protected” women out of good jobs.80 
As noted, some occupations were entirely off limits. Even when 
women were technically permitted to work in various industries, 
employers frequently preferred to hire men who could work longer 
hours or night shifts. After the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was 
enacted in 1938, women in businesses that were covered by FLSA 
particularly resented not being able to earn premium wages for 
overtime work.81 The “protection” was also incomplete. Although 
justified by women’s “maternal functions,” none of the laws explicitly 
facilitated work by pregnant employees and none required job-
guaranteed or paid maternity leave. Rather, throughout this time, it 
remained common to fire women or force them to take unpaid leave as 
soon as their pregnancies began to show,82 and employers sometimes 
had more general formal or informal bans on married women working 
at all.83 
 
 77 Id. In 1923, the Supreme Court held that a women-specific minimum wage law 
violated freedom of contract, distinguishing Muller and similar cases on the ground 
that sex-specific maximum-hour laws responded to “real” physical differences 
between the sexes and did not reach the “heart of” employment contracts. See Adkins 
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553-54 (1923). Fourteen years later, the Supreme 
Court overruled Adkins and upheld a women-specific minimum wage law, paving the 
way for additional women-specific minimum wage laws, as well as the sex-neutral Fair 
Labor Standards Act. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 
(1937); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359, 368-69 (2009). 
 78 PSCW, AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 76, at 240-41. 
 79 208 U.S. at 422. 
 80 See, e.g., KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 72, at 193-95 (discussing prohibitions on 
women’s night work excluded them from good jobs); Franklin, supra note 65, at 1326-
27 (quoting similar arguments made in support of adding “sex” to Title VII).  
 81 COBBLE, supra note 36, at 186-87.  
 82 Id. at 127. Cobble notes that the extent of “protection” varied by race and class; 
African American women were rarely subject to mandatory leave or transferred to 
light duty positions. Id.  
 83 See CLAUDIA GOLDEN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN WOMEN 160-79 (1990). 
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Because the protective labor laws provided both benefits and costs, 
feminists were divided on their utility and whether they could coexist 
comfortably with more general commitments to nondiscrimination on 
the basis of sex. In the 1920s and ensuing decades, many feminist 
leaders opposed efforts to enact an Equal Rights Amendment because 
they feared it would require the repeal of protective legislation.84 In 
1963, just a year before the enactment of Title VII, the Presidential 
Commission on the Status of Women issued an influential report 
outlining recommendations for legal and societal reform to advance 
women’s interests. A committee established to review labor standards 
advocated retention and expansion of women-specific maximum hour 
laws, characterizing them as the “main bulwark against extensive 
hours of work” that “create[] a climate in within which American 
women can function effectively and productively as workers and, at 
the same time, can participate in community and citizenship 
responsibilities.”85 The Commission itself, however, rejected this 
committee recommendation, advocating that state maximum hour 
laws should be maintained only while efforts were made to extend 
FLSA’s coverage and that in the long term women would be best 
served by being treated no differently from men in this respect.86 
When Title VII was passed, with its general prohibition on 
discrimination “because of sex,” these questions became even more 
pressing. The EEOC initially took a case-by-case approach to resolving 
complaints based on exclusions pursuant to these state laws, 
characterizing the issue as “one of the most difficult legal questions 
the Commission faced.”87 At hearings held during 1966 and 1967, 
some labor feminists urged the Commission to permit “beneficial” 
laws to be enforced until they could be expanded to cover male and 
female workers.88 Others, led by the newly-formed National 
Organization for Women (“NOW”), took a more hard-lined approach, 
arguing that the EEOC should hold sex-based state labor laws violated 
Title VII.89 NOW contended that even seemingly salutary laws hurt 
 
 84 See id. at 60-68; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 72, at 206-14; Serena Mayeri, 
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
755, 762-63 (2004); see generally Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: 
The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188 (1991) (discussing debate and 
various drafts of the ERA developed to attempt to address these concerns). 
 85 PCSW, AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 76, at 133.  
 86 Id. at 56.  
 87 EEOC, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 43. 
 88 COBBLE, supra note 36, at 186. 
 89 Id. 
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women by reinforcing stereotypes regarding women’s need for 
protection and making women less attractive as employees. Notably, 
however, as late as 1967, a representative of NOW made a distinction 
between laws based on “real biological factors, such as maternity 
leaves, separate rest rooms, pregnancy and the like,” which she 
asserted were “compatible with Title VII,” and those “based on 
stereotypes as to sex,” such as maximum hour laws, which she argued 
should be repealed.90 By the following decade, NOW’s position was 
more absolute. 
B. (Underinclusive) Disability Classifications 
Before the twentieth century, workers generally received no 
assistance from their employers with medical expenses or lost income 
caused by illness or injury. During the period that the special 
treatment/equal treatment debate was heating up, however, employers 
responded to competitive pressures and government mandates by 
dramatically increasing their support for health conditions other than 
pregnancy that interfered with work. The benefits provided by this 
new public-private social safety net were an essential element of the 
debates over Title VII’s application to pregnancy, but the significance 
and scope of this rapid growth has been little discussed in historical 
work on the PDA. This section fills in this missing history; Part III 
shows how it should inform current doctrine. 
The first group of laws requiring employers to provide support for 
physical impairments was workers’ compensation laws (originally, and 
tellingly, called “workmen’s” compensation), which address employer 
responsibility for workplace injuries. In 1910, New York passed the 
first such law that withstood constitutional scrutiny; in the next five 
years, thirty-two more states enacted workers’ compensation 
legislation.91 They continued to expand rapidly. By 1921, forty-four 
states had programs in place, and by 1949, all states had enacted at 
least some protections.92 These laws typically require employers to 
cover health-care costs and a portion of wage replacement.93 They are 
 
 90 Id. (quoting Daily Labor Report, May 2, 1967; “Statement of UAW [also 
representing NOW] to EEOC, May 2, 1967”). 
 91 PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: 
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 103-04 (2007). In 1910, New York enacted 
both a mandatory and an elective program; the former was held unconstitutional, 
leading to a state constitutional amendment. See id.  
 92 Id. at 104; Tamela D. Jerrell, A History of Legally Required Employee Benefits: 
1900-1950, 3 J. OF MANAGEMENT HIST. 193, 199 (1993).  
 93 For a helpful overview of workers’ compensation generally, see Nat’l Acad. of Soc. 
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based on the understanding that employers often bear at least partial 
responsibility for accidents that occur at work. Employees who receive 
workers’ compensation generally must waive any potential tort claim 
they might otherwise have against the employer, and benefits are 
typically scaled according to the severity of the injury incurred. 
Employers may reduce the amount they owe under most workers’ 
compensation statutes by offering employees injured at work 
alternative “light duty” positions or other modified work 
assignments.94 
Employer support for medical conditions that do not stem from 
work — and thus for which employers bear no direct responsibility — 
became common in the period during and after World War II. After 
early efforts to develop government-provided health insurance failed 
in this country,95 employers began to sponsor health insurance for 
their employees as an employee benefit.96 These plans used a variety of 
mechanisms to provide assistance with the cost of hospital and 
physician services. In 1930, only 1.2 million employees (and an 
additional 1-2 million dependents) received employer-sponsored 
health insurance.97 By 1940, 6 million members were enrolled, 
generally through their employers, in Blue Cross plans alone; that 
number tripled to 19 million in 1945 and almost tripled again to 52 
million by 1958.98 This exponential growth was partially explained by 
 
Ins., Workers Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs 2010 (2012), NASI.ORG, 
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/NASI_Workers_Comp_2010.pdf. For 
summaries of each state’s plan, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., State by State Comparison 
of Worker’s Compensation Laws, NFIB.COM, http://www.nfib.com/legal-center/compliance-
resource-center/compliance-resource-item/cmsid/57181 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).  
 94 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-18.2 (West 2012) (describing “suitable 
alternative employment” provisions); see also Nicole Krause et al., Modified Work and 
Return to Work: A Review of the Literature, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 113, 135 
(1998) (literature review concluding that modified work programs such as light duty 
“may lead to substantial reductions in disability and workers’ compensation costs”). 
 95 See, e.g., INST. OF MED., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT 
RISK 58-65 (1993) (discussing unsuccessful state and federal efforts during the 1910s 
and 1920s to mandate government-sponsored insurance).  
 96 See id. at 65-70; JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE 
SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 16-52, 162-257 (2006) 
(discussing emergence of health insurance as an employment benefit); Jennifer Klein, 
The Politics of Economic Security: Employee Benefits and the Privatization of New Deal 
Liberalism, 16 J. POL. HIST. 34 (2004) (same); William J. Wiatrowski, Family-Related 
Benefits in the Workplace, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 28, 30 (1990) (same).  
 97 INST. OF MED., supra note 95, at 66. Health insurance during this period was also 
sometimes provided through community collectives, unions, or other mechanisms, 
but these programs were also relatively small. See id. 
 98 Id. at 68. 
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federal policies — persisting to this day — that encouraged employers 
to provide support for health insurance in lieu of cash wages.99 
In this time period, it also became common for employers to adopt a 
variety of fringe benefits that shelter employees from income loss 
otherwise experienced when medical conditions make it impossible to 
work.100 For example, paid sick days typically provide full salary for 
relatively short absences. Temporary disability policies provide partial 
income replacement for wages lost during longer periods that an 
employee cannot work, with a typical maximum of twenty-six weeks. 
Employer-sponsored life insurance, long-term disability insurance, 
and retirement benefits provide relief for employees who leave the 
workplace permanently, either through choice or by necessity. These 
private programs supplemented the public social security system, 
which began offering pension benefits in 1935 and long-term disability 
benefits in 1956.101 (Notably, even these public programs use prior 
employment, or marriage to a wage-earner, to determine eligibility and 
benefit levels; public benefits for those who lack a regular connection 
to paid work are less generous and more stigmatized.102) 
Employers, then and now, generally may choose whether to provide 
health-related benefits other than workers’ compensation. A handful of 
states, however, mandate temporary disability insurance for short-
term interruptions from work. In 1942, Rhode Island passed the first 
 
 99 Id. at 70-71 (discussing importance of federal labor policies excluding health-
related benefits from wages –– and thus wage caps –– during World War II, and of tax 
policies permitting employers generally to deduct health-related expenses and 
employees to exclude the value of the benefits from their taxable income). Court 
rulings in the late 1940s also held that benefits were subject to collective bargaining, 
further increasing their prevalence. See Wiatrowski, supra note 96, at 30. 
 100 See, e.g., Walter W. Kolodrubetz, Two Decades of Employee-Benefit Plans, 1950-
1970: A Review, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 10-22 (1972) (reviewing growth in employee 
benefits in these areas); Wiatrowski, supra note 96, at 30-31 (same). 
 101 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. ch. 7); Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. 84-880, 70 Stat. 807. 
 102 See, e.g., Stephanie Moller, Supporting Poor Single Mothers: Gender and Race in 
the U.S. Welfare State, 16 GENDER & SOC. 465, 465-66 (2002) (“Individuals with 
sufficient work history and wages qualify for the relatively generous, federal funded, 
top-tier social insurance programs such as social security and Medicare. Individuals 
without consistent work history are relegated to the bottom tier, where they must 
prove destitution to qualify for meager amounts of assistance from locally 
administered and highly stigmatized programs.”); see also Nancy Fraser & Linda 
Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 
SIGNS 309, 321-23 (1994) (describing how “first-track programs like unemployment 
and old age insurance offered aid as an entitlement without stigma” and arguing 
“second-track” programs like welfare were purposefully stigmatized to make social 
security more acceptable). 
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such law, defining a qualifying “sickness” as a “physical or mental 
condition [that makes an employee] unable to perform his regular or 
customary work.”103 By 1970, four additional states, including the 
heavily-populated states of New York, New Jersey, and California, had 
created mandatory temporary disability programs.104 In most states, 
the programs are funded through contributions from both employers 
and employees; employers with qualifying private plans are usually 
excused from contributing to the government-operated fund.105 
Even in the absence of more general federal or state mandates, 
employer support for employee health conditions became relatively 
standard. As a 1972 report declared, “[e]mployee-benefit plans are 
now the predominant institution through which most workers and 
their families obtain basic medical care protection.”106 In 1969, 
approximately 80% of persons under 65 had health insurance covering 
at least hospital care, with many receiving this coverage through their 
employers (either their own or their spouse’s); persons over 65 could 
receive health insurance through Medicare or Medicaid.107 At that 
time, the Social Security Administration estimated that almost two-
thirds of all workers were covered by plans providing cash benefits for 
short-term disabilities.108 Thus, although this hybrid public-private 
social safety net certainly had some gaps, it represented a dramatic 
expansion of employer-provided and employment-related support for 
health needs. 
 
 103 1942 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 1200, § 2 (13).  
 104 See U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 44-
49 (1997). For an overview of each state’s law, see SOC. FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS LAWS (2012), available at http://www.shrm.org/ 
legalissues/stateandlocalresources/stateandlocalstatutesandregulations/documents/tem
porary%20disability%20benefits%20laws.pdf. For a helpful discussion of the 
interaction of these programs with workers’ compensation benefits and with social 
security benefits, see Nat’l Acad. of Soc. Insur., supra note 93, at 45-50. 
 105 U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 104, at 48. 
 106 Kolodrubetz, supra note 100, at 10. 
 107 Marjorie Smith Mueller, Private Health Insurance in 1969: A Review, 34 SOC. SEC. 
BULL. 2, 3-4 (1971); see also Wiatrowski, supra note 96, at 31 (noting that in 1971, 
97% of full-time office workers in metropolitan areas had insurance covering 
hospitalizations and 90% had insurance covering doctors’ visits; the comparable 
numbers for plant workers were 93% and 75%). 
 108 Daniel N. Price, Cash Benefits for Short-Term Sickness, 1948-69, 34 SOC. SEC. 
BULL. 1, 19 (1971). In jurisdictions that did not require temporary disability insurance, 
only 50% of employees in private industry had formal coverage. Id.; see also 
Wiatrowski, supra note 96, at 31 (noting that in 1971, 87% of full-time office, and 
82% of full-time plant, workers in metropolitan areas had short-term disability 
coverage or sick days).  
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But disability and health insurance policies often excluded 
pregnancy entirely, or offered less generous support for pregnancy 
than other medical conditions. On the public side, Rhode Island 
served as a “cautionary” example against providing generous 
pregnancy benefits. Its path-breaking temporary disability legislation 
permitted pregnant employees to claim benefits. Initially, the mere fact 
of pregnancy was sufficient to meet the disability standard, rather than 
requiring a showing that pregnancy interfered with the ability to 
work.109 Under this generous standard, pregnancy accounted for 
approximately 30% of all benefits paid by the 1949-50 benefit year.110 
Rhode Island responded by restricting pregnancy more than other 
disabilities by placing flat dollar limits on pregnancy benefits; 
pregnancy benefits then declined to constitute approximately 7% of 
total benefits paid.111 The four states that followed Rhode Island in 
enacting temporary disability policies learned from Rhode Island’s 
experience. Three of them excluded pregnancy from coverage entirely, 
and the fourth (New Jersey) provided less generous coverage for 
pregnancy than for other disabilities.112 State unemployment insurance 
statutes generally also had special pregnancy disqualifications.113 
Private policies also tended to exclude pregnancy. Historian 
Dorothy Sue Cobble asserts that in the early years after World War II, 
pregnancy was almost always excluded from employers’ temporary 
disability provisions.114 Coverage increased during the 1950s and 
1960s, particularly in unionized workplaces,115 but it was still far from 
standard. A 1969 report studying temporary disability policies issued 
by the eleven large insurance companies found that less than half 
permitted pregnancy-related claims at all.116 Pregnancy was also often 
excluded from employer-provided health insurance. In 1970, only 
61% of individuals with health insurance received maternity benefits, 
and even those that did often included special limitations on 
coverage.117 
 
 109 Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing Leave: Job-Related 
Benefits, 17 N.Y. L. FORUM 480, 485 (1971). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.; Dinner, supra note 16, at 453. 
 113 PCSW, AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 76, at 63; Koontz, supra note 109, at 486.  
 114 COBBLE, supra note 36, at 127.  
 115 Id. at 129. 
 116 Koontz, supra note 109, at 491.  
 117 Id.  
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During this time period, there were efforts to support pregnancy 
specifically and separately from other health needs. The most 
important of these was the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, which 
provided several years of funding for federal-state partnership 
programs to improve maternal and infant health, including provision 
of medical services for childbirth.118 But in 1927, when the legislation 
was up for reauthorization, the American Medical Association and 
other organizations successfully lobbied against it and it was allowed 
to expire two years later.119 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
bills were proposed that would have amended the Social Security Act 
to provide maternity benefits, but none was enacted.120 
Advocates considering Title VII’s coverage of pregnancy tracked 
these developments. Indeed, one of the primary sources for the history 
recounted above is a comprehensive report addressing support for 
childbirth and childrearing published in 1971 by Elizabeth Duncan 
Koontz, the Director of the U.S. Department of Labor Women’s 
Bureau.121 
C. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Pregnancy As Sex and Disability 
The special treatment/equal treatment debate regarding labor 
regulation of women’s work and the rapid growth in employer support 
for health conditions generally sets the backdrop for the debate that 
led to and followed enactment of the PDA. Advocates disagreed about 
whether pregnancy was best considered, and specially accommodated, 
as a sex-based characteristic or whether it should be framed instead as 
a disability like any other physical condition that sometimes interferes 
with work. At the same time, the EEOC and courts struggled with the 
related question of whether exclusion of pregnancy from disability 
policies or health insurance constituted sex discrimination. 
In 1970, the Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 
the successor organization to the influential President’s Commission 
established in the early 1960s, embraced a strongly-worded 
commitment to the disability approach. The Council passed a 
resolution declaring: 
Childbirth and complications of pregnancy are, for all job-related 
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such 
 
 118 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 506-12 (1992).  
 119 Id. at 512-22. 
 120 COBBLE, supra note 36, at 129-30. 
 121 Koontz, supra note 109, at 480 n.*.  
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under any health insurance, temporary disability insurance, or 
sick leave plan of an employer, union, fraternal society. . . . No 
additional or different benefits or restrictions should be 
applied to disability because of pregnancy or childbirth, and 
no pregnant woman employee should be in a better position in 
relation to job-related practices or benefits than an employee 
similarly situated suffering from other disability.122 
As a strategic matter for an organization committed to expanding 
opportunities for women, this was a prudent position to take. In most 
instances, other disabilities received more robust support than 
pregnancy. That said, the policy also explicitly opposed treating 
pregnant women better than those with other disabilities. This position 
— which was a dramatic shift from the Council’s earlier support for 
specific maternity leaves123 — reflects the special treatment/equal 
treatment debate. In explaining its rationale for the 1970 resolution, 
the Council claimed that offering pregnant employees more generous 
benefits than those available to men or women with other disabilities 
would be “divisive” and could lead to “reluctance to hire women of 
childbearing age.”124 
The EEOC quickly followed suit. As described in subpart A, the 
EEOC’s first statements regarding Title VII’s application to pregnancy 
had been ad hoc and inconsistent. An agency official later admitted 
that they were reluctant to take a position while feminists remained 
divided.125 By 1972, after extensive internal discussion, and the 
development of a more unified position by women’s rights leaders 
outside the organization, the EEOC discussed pregnancy in formal 
guidelines on sex discrimination. The guidelines addressed both 
discrimination and accommodation issues. On the former, they 
provided that a “written or unwritten policy which excludes . . . 
employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of Title 
VII.”126 On the latter, they provided that: 
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, 
miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, 
 
 122 Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Job-Related Maternity 
Benefits (1970) (emphasis added), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ 
ED094156.pdf.  
 123 See Dinner, supra note 16, at 450 (stating that in 1966, the Council supported 
maternity-specific leaves). 
 124 Id. at 455. 
 125 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 15. 
 126 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10, as printed in 37 Fed. Reg. 6837 (Apr. 5, 1972). 
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for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities, and should 
be treated as such under any health or temporary disability 
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with 
employment.127 
The EEOC’s guidelines largely follow the Citizens’ Advisory Council’s 
approach, but they do not affirmatively oppose granting pregnancy 
more expansive protections than other disabilities. Rather, the 
guidelines suggest that pregnant employees could challenge no-leave 
policies under the disparate impact doctrine then-recently enunciated 
by the Supreme Court.128 Lower courts followed the EEOC’s guidance. 
In the early 1970s, circuit and district courts consistently held that 
Title VII was violated if employers selectively excluded pregnancy 
from disability benefits or sick days, as well as if employers discharged 
employees for pregnancy-related reasons.129 
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Geduldig v. Aiello,130 the Court 
considered whether California’s temporary disability insurance 
program, which excluded coverage for pregnancy, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Significantly, by the time the Supreme Court 
decided the case, California courts had already interpreted the statute 
to permit claims for disabilities stemming from pregnancy 
complications; accordingly, the only issue before the Supreme Court 
was whether exclusion of benefits for “normal delivery and 
recuperation” was permissible.131 The threshold determination was 
whether the exclusion constituted a classification on the basis of sex, 
and thus would be reviewed under the Court’s just-then-emerging 
intermediate scrutiny doctrine.132 The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held 
 
 127 Id. (emphasis added).  
 128 Id. § 1604.10(c); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
 129 See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T Co., 513 F.2d 1024 
(2d Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy from employer disability policy violated Title 
VII); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); Farkas v. 
South Western City Sch. Dist., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to pay pregnant 
employees for sick days violated Title VII); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 
629 (2d Cir. 1973) (requiring pregnant teacher take leave of absence violated Title 
VII). 
 130 417 U.S. 484 (1974). For a detailed discussion of early pregnancy dismissal 
cases, see generally Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J. L. & 
FEMINISM 343 (2012). 
 131 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 491-92. Three of the four individual appellees had 
disabilities that were attributable to “abnormal complications” during pregnancy; the 
fourth claimed benefits based on a “normal pregnancy.” Id. at 489. California courts 
subsequently interpreted the statute to permit benefits be paid for pregnancy 
complications but not for “normal pregnancy and delivery.” Id. at 491. 
 132 The Court had not yet settled on a standard of scrutiny for sex-based 
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that it did not. It reasoned that the policy divided employees into two 
categories — “pregnant persons” and “nonpregnant persons” — and 
that although the former consisted entirely of women, the latter 
included both women and men.133 Characterizing pregnancy as an 
“objectively identifiable physical condition with unique conditions” 
(but not explaining the significance this classification held), the Court 
concluded that lawmakers were free to include or exclude pregnancy 
from legislation “on any reasonable basis” and that the cost-related 
concerns enunciated by the State were clearly sufficient.134 
Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court faced 
the same question under Title VII, this time in a challenge brought to 
a private employer’s plan that likewise excluded pregnancy benefits 
from an otherwise comprehensive temporary disability policy.135 The 
Court, again in a 6-3 decision, followed the reasoning in Geduldig to 
hold that the exclusion did not constitute “discrimination . . . because 
of sex.” The Court primarily relied upon the imperfect fit between the 
classification and sex, quoting the pregnant/non-pregnant persons 
section of Geduldig, but also opined that pregnancy was “significantly 
different from the typical covered disease or disability” in that it is 
“not a ‘disease’ at all.”136 This distinction was important because it 
allowed the Court to conclude that exclusion of pregnancy — a 
condition experienced exclusively by women — was not grounds to 
infer “invidious” discrimination against women.137 Rather, the Court 
implicitly held that GE’s stated concern with increased costs was 
sufficient justification for the policy.138 The Court explained its refusal 
to defer to the EEOC’s contrary guidance on the ground that the 
 
classifications. Geduldig post-dated Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) 
(plurality expressed support for strict scrutiny) but predated Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 197 (1976) (majority endorsed what became known as intermediate scrutiny).  
 133 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
 134 Id. 
 135 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978). One year after Gilbert was decided, the Supreme Court was a little more 
receptive to a sex-based claim based on a pregnancy exclusion, holding that a policy 
that permitted employees on disability leave for conditions other than pregnancy to 
retain seniority but denied retention of seniority for pregnancy could violate Title VII. 
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). 
 136 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135, 136. 
 137 Id. at 136. 
 138 Id. at 130-32 (discussing district court’s findings regarding increased costs that 
would be incurred if pregnancy were covered). General Electric had argued that these 
additional (alleged) costs provided a legitimate non-discriminatory justification for the 
pregnancy exclusion. Brief for Petitioner at 53-61, Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 
125 (1976) (No. 74-1589, 74-1590). 
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formal guidance did not accord with the EEOC’s first opinion letters 
on point.139 
On the day that the decision in Gilbert was announced, ACLU 
attorney Susan Dellar Ross (who had earlier, as an EEOC lawyer, 
helped formulate the agency’s sex and pregnancy guidelines) and 
International Union of Electrical Workers Association General 
Counsel Ruth Weyand (who had argued Gilbert) took the first steps 
towards organizing support for amending Title VII to override the 
decision.140 Ultimately, this became a broad-based coalition of more 
than 200 organizations that worked together to draft and lobby for the 
bill that became the PDA. The coalition was rather unusual. In 
addition to women’s rights groups, the broader civil rights 
community, and labor unions, it included several pro-life 
organizations concerned that the discrimination permitted by Gilbert 
would spur women to seek abortions rather than risk loss of income 
due to pregnancy.141 
The coalition established a drafting committee that took the lead in 
shaping the bill.142 Kevin Schwartz, who conducted interviews with 
key players and reviewed a treasure trove of published and 
unpublished documents, provides a window into the deliberative 
process. Drafters considered, but quickly rejected, a mandate to 
provide mandatory leave or other accommodations specifically for 
pregnancy. The leaders of the coalition argued against the proposal on 
the grounds that it would increase the likelihood of backlash and 
“raise questions about whether the government ought affirmatively to 
‘encourage’ childbearing rather than simply requiring neutrality.”143 
They likewise considered and rejected simply codifying the EEOC’s 
pregnancy guidelines.144 They opted instead to provide a definition of 
“sex” that addressed Title VII’s application to pregnancy. They 
thought this approach would “establish a governing principle . . . 
[that] leaves enforcement agencies free to develop interpretations as 
times change and . . . give courts the opportunity to shape doctrine in 
light of the general intent of the Congress rather than being limited to 
 
 139 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142-43. 
 140 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 24-28, 58 (discussing Ross’s role in crafting EEOC 
guidelines); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 126 (identifying Weyand as counsel for Gilbert).  
 141 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 63-67. 
 142 Id. at 69. 
 143 Id. at 73 (quoting Susan Dellar Ross, interview with author, Oct. 20, 2004 and 
Wendy Williams et al., Memorandum in Support of a General Definition Statute 
Overruling General Electric v. Gilbert, Dec. 21, 1976, at 8 n.5). 
 144 Id. at 70-71.  
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what the Congress at one time was able to anticipate.”145 It also had 
the independent political benefit of limiting the extent to which Title 
VII was “opened up,” a key factor for maintaining support from the 
general civil rights community concerned that a broader bill could 
become a vehicle for other amendments that would weaken Title VII’s 
core principles.146 
Most debate over the substance of the bill thus predated its actual 
introduction in Congress. The bill as introduced included, word-for-
word, the entire first sentence of what became the PDA. It provides: 
That section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: 
“(k) The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected 
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title 
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. . . .”147 
As discussed more fully in Part III, this first clause supersedes the 
reasoning in Gilbert to make clear that decisions based on “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions” are “because of sex.” This 
language, in conjunction with Title VII’s general prohibition on 
“discrimination because of . . . sex,” should be (and generally has 
been) understood to prohibit adverse employment actions such as 
forced leaves or terminations due to pregnancy. The second clause is 
more directly relevant in challenges to denial of accommodations. It 
not only supersedes the specific result in Gilbert concerning exclusion 
from temporary disability plans but provides more generally that 
pregnancy must be treated the same for “all employment-related 
purposes” as any other condition that causes comparable limitations. 
Although various amendments or alternative approaches were 
floated during Congressional consideration, including proposals to cap 
the duration of pregnancy disability benefits, none gained traction. 
The only substantive change made to the bill was the addition of a 
 
 145 Id. at 73-74 (quoting Wendy Williams et al., Memorandum in Support of a 
General Definition Statute Overruling General Electric v. Gilbert, Dec. 21, 1976, at 1). 
 146 Id. at 75-76. 
 147 S. 995, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
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second sentence addressing its application to abortion.148 The Senate 
committee also amended the bill to create a transition period and 
specify, importantly, that benefits could not be reduced as a 
mechanism for compliance.149 
Review of the legislative history establishes that members of 
Congress understood — and embraced — the concerns that had been 
voiced by feminist advocates. First, Congressional leaders were clear 
that protecting women from pregnancy discrimination was necessary 
because pregnant women’s earnings were essential for families. For 
example, the Senate committee report quoted hearing testimony 
documenting that “‘[w]orking women have become a major part of 
this country’s work force . . . [and that] [m]ost of these women work 
out of hard economic necessity.’”150 The committee cited studies 
establishing that 70% of working women were divorced, single, or 
widowed; their families’ sole wage earner; or married to men who 
made less than $7,000 per year, approximately $27,000 in today’s 
dollars.151 Even then, at least 10% of births were to unmarried 
women.152 Numerous floor statements likewise sought to counter the 
misperception that women typically worked for “pin money” that 
would be little missed.153 
Congressional sponsors and supporters also firmly endorsed the 
principle that pregnancy should be treated (at least) as well as other 
medical conditions that interfered with an ability to work. As a 
threshold matter, legislators considered and rejected arguments that 
pregnancy differed from classic disabilities because it was frequently 
planned or a cause for celebration, noting that it was sometimes not 
voluntary and that other “voluntary” health conditions were typically 
covered.154 Rather, the Senate committee report emphasized that 
 
 148 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 
(1978); see also Schwartz, supra note 16, at 104-10 (discussing the addition of the 
abortion provisions). 
 149 Pregnancy Discrimination Act §§ 2, 3. 
 150 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 9 (1977) (quoting the American Nurses’ Association).  
 151 Id. The contemporary dollar valuation is based on the consumer price index. See 
DOLLARTIMES, dollartimes.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).  
 152 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 9. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
reported in 1980 that 18.4% of births were to unmarried women, suggesting that the 
committee’s figures may well be low. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
 153 E.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUM. RES., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 at 3 (Comm. Print 1980) (statement of Sen. 
Williams); id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Hawkins); id. at 166 (statement of Rep. 
Hawkins).  
 154 For example, even Senator Hatch, who proposed several amendments that 
would have weakened the bill in various respects, id. at 56-58, stated he was generally 
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pregnancy should be assessed in the context of the functional 
limitations that it caused and their similarity to other limitations 
employers accommodated: 
By defining sex discrimination to include discrimination 
against pregnant women, the bill rejects the view that 
employers may treat pregnancy and its incidents as sui generis, 
without regard to its functional comparability with other 
conditions. . . . Pregnant women who are able to work must be 
permitted to work on the same conditions as other employees; 
and when they are not able to work for medical reasons, they 
must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other 
benefits, as other workers who are disabled from working.155 
The House committee report likewise emphasized “[t]he bill would 
simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other 
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.”156 
That said, members of Congress understood that requiring 
employers to accommodate pregnancy to the same extent they 
accommodated other health-related needs could and would impose 
costs on employers. Indeed, opposition to the bill focused almost 
entirely on the scope of increased costs and its applicability to 
abortion.157 The committees reviewing the bill rejected industry 
estimations that it would increase employer costs by more than $1 
billion, but they accepted Department of Labor projections that it 
would impose approximately $190 million in additional expenses.158 
The Senate committee report even echoes the balancing test already 
embedded in Title VII’s religious accommodation provisions, stating 
 
supportive because disability policies covered many other conditions that were not 
involuntary or “diseases.” Id. at 109 (“[I]f disability programs can have hair 
transplants and vasectomies and things of that order that I do not consider to be 
diseases, then maybe we should do something for the lady who has to work who 
happens to become pregnant.”). 
 155 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 156 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4 (1978). Such language in the legislative history, often 
accompanied by statements that employers would not be required to create any new 
benefits for pregnant employees, has fueled confusion regarding the viability of 
disparate impact claims challenging no-leave policies and other denials of 
accommodations. However, since the PDA’s definitional amendment applies to all of 
the substantive provisions of Title VII, disparate impact claims should be available. 
For a discussion of these issues, see sources cited infra note 264.  
 157 Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 (1987).  
 158 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 11; H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 10.  
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that the costs, “although not negligible, [could] be sustained without 
any undue burden on employers.”159 
Both reports likewise explained that the structure of the bill — 
amending Title VII’s definitional provisions — ensured that it would 
apply to any employment practice that affected the “terms and 
conditions” of employment, including disability and sick leave 
benefits, medical benefits, hiring and promotion decisions, accrual of 
retirement benefits, and seniority structures.160 The House report 
explicitly provides that the requirement to treat pregnant employees 
the “same” as other employees would include employer practices such 
as “transferring workers to lighter assignments,”161 a practice that was 
already a common mechanism for reducing workers’ compensation 
payments. Equally important, at the time the PDA was enacted, several 
states mandated employers provide temporary disability benefits but 
permitted pregnancy to be treated less favorably than other 
disabilities.162 The reports make clear that employers could no longer 
make such distinctions — pregnancy would need to be treated like 
any other disabling condition.163 
This review of legislative history establishes several key principles 
that reinforce the plain language mandate that employers must treat 
pregnancy “the same” as they treat any other health condition that 
causes similar limitations.164 First, the PDA was enacted with the 
understanding that women’s earnings were essential for their own 
economic security and that of their families; thus, employers should 
not be able to force pregnant employees onto unpaid leaves if they 
 
 159 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 9; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (requiring employers 
provide reasonable accommodations for religious practice unless it causes an “undue 
hardship”).  
 160 S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3-6; H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 4-7. 
 161 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5. 
 162 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 11 (discussing variation in the extent to which 
then-existing state disability plans covered pregnancy); supra text accompanying notes 
109-112 (same). 
 163 H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (“This bill would require that women disabled by 
pregnancy . . . be provided the same benefits as those provided other disabled 
workers. This would include temporary and long-term disability insurance, sick leave, 
and other forms of employee benefit programs.”); S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4 (similar).  
 164 Although some judges, most notably Justice Scalia, generally refuse to consider 
legislative history, many others will consult legislative history, particularly committee 
reports. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 72 n.1 (2012) (documenting 
continuing importance of legislative history in recent statutory interpretation cases). 
In this instance, as I describe more fully in Part III, the legislative history simply 
bolsters the natural reading of the plain text.  
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accommodate other health conditions through workplace 
modifications. Second, the legislation was intended to address the full 
range of employment policies, not merely the disability insurance at 
stake in Gilbert itself. Third, it required employers to treat pregnancy 
(at least) as well as other health conditions that similarly affected 
workers, and it was understood that doing so would impose costs on 
many employers. And fourth, discriminatory bias was not required. 
Exclusion of pregnancy from disability policies — even if justified by 
state statute or cost-based concerns — was identified a clear violation. 
D. Pregnancy Preferences? 
The PDA’s language is easy to apply to adverse actions based on 
animus or bias regarding pregnancy. These are clearly illegal. But the 
proper interpretation of the PDA is less clear in two different 
scenarios. One, which is the focus of my analysis in this Article, is 
whether employers may treat pregnant employees less well than other 
disabled employees if their actions are not motivated by discriminatory 
bias. The other is the inverse question: Whether an employer may 
provide accommodations for pregnant employees that it does not 
provide for other employees with health conditions that cause similar 
limitations. Although the former question has been considered 
relatively infrequently by courts or commentators, the latter has been 
widely litigated and exhaustively discussed. This subpart briefly 
addresses that second question before turning back to the first, in part 
because current misconceptions of the accommodation mandate may 
stem in part from the widespread attention given to the second 
question. 
The “preferential” treatment question erupted almost immediately 
after the enactment of the PDA. At the same time as the PDA was 
working its way through Congress, California responded to the Gilbert 
decision in a very different way. It enacted a statute that required most 
employers to provide up to four months of job-protected disability 
leave for pregnancy, even if they did not provide comparable leaves for 
other disabilities. A handful of other states had similar statutes. The 
California statute was challenged in a case called California Federal 
Savings and Loan v. Guerra (commonly known as Cal Fed), which 
ultimately was decided by the Supreme Court.165 
 
 165 479 U.S. 272 (1987); see also Kay, supra note 14, at 10-20 (discussing 
background of Cal Fed and similar case, Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & 
Industry, challenging a comparable Montana statute). 
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The case confronted the special treatment/equal treatment debate 
head-on. The accepted narrative is the feminist leaders were “deeply 
divided,” as they had earlier been over the ERA and the advisability of 
maintaining protective labor legislation.166 There is truth in this 
assertion. In law review articles written while the case was pending 
and amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court (many authored by 
the same law professors and advocates), feminists debated the best 
way to conceptualize equality and pregnancy.167 But focusing on the 
strategic disagreement about the advisability of “special treatment” 
obscures the extent to which there was considerable common ground 
between the groups. 
Broadly speaking, California-based organizations and academics 
fought to keep their law, contending that mandating a pregnancy leave 
was the only way to treat men and women “equally” in their ability to 
work and to reproduce. They sought to distinguish the law from the 
“protective” labor legislation of the past, arguing that those laws were 
based on inaccurate stereotypes, but that pregnancy was a “real 
physical sex-based difference” that must be taken into account.168 The 
primary East Coast feminist and progressive organizations, including 
NOW, the ACLU, and the League of Women Voters, disagreed. They 
argued that “special treatment” of pregnancy ultimately worked to the 
 
 166 See, e.g., MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 215 (1994) 
(Cal Fed put the feminist legal community into a state of “tension and disarray”); 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnant and Working: The Story of California Federal Savings 
& Loan v. Guerra, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES 253, 254 (Elizabeth M. Schneider 
& Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011) (characterizing the two sides as “warring 
factions”).  
 167 Significant contemporary discussions in law reviews included: Finley, supra 
note 13; Littleton, supra note 14; Kay, supra note 14; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 
14; Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra note 13. Many of these authors also participated 
in litigating Cal Fed. Linda Krieger represented the actual party of interest in her 
initial proceedings before the state agency. See Wildman, supra note 166, at 255. 
Others took leading roles writing amicus curiae briefs. See Brief for Coalition for Equal 
Rights Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728374 (Herma Hill Kay, of counsel); Brief for 
Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 
(No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728372 (Christine Littleton, of counsel); Brief for Coalition 
for National Organization of Women et al. as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728368 (Wendy Williams, 
of counsel). Susan Deller Ross, who had helped draft the EEOC guidelines and then 
led the coalition that enacted the PDA, was also “of counsel” on the NOW brief. Id. 
 168 Brief for Coalition of Equal Rights Advocates, supra note 167 at 1, 5-9; Brief for 
Coalition for California Women Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 13-15, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (No. 
85-494) 1986 WL 728370. 
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disadvantage of women because it spurred ex ante discrimination 
against women and reinforced stereotypes that women are only 
marginal workers.169 
But both groups of feminists claimed that employees in California 
should have a job-guaranteed right to leave for pregnancy. They did 
this by contending that to the extent that California statute conflicted 
with Title VII, the proper resolution would be to raise the level of 
protections offered all disabilities rather than remove the explicit 
protections for pregnancy.170 In other words, the “women-specific” 
benefit should be expanded to men.171 As a practical matter, this 
would likely have been easy. Many employers, including Cal Fed, 
already had temporary disability policies covering conditions other 
than pregnancy that were similar to the mandated maternity leave.172 
In this respect, the feminist organizations were united in their 
disagreement with Cal Fed and business-affiliated amici that argued 
the PDA’s “same treatment” mandate meant that the California statute 
simply could not be enforced. 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, ultimately held that Title VII 
did not preempt the California statute. The majority opinion 
acknowledged that the plain text of the PDA suggests equal treatment 
would be required but relied on a (now rather discredited) statutory 
interpretation principle that sanctioned privileging Congress’s intent 
 
 169 See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae at 10, 
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494) 1986 WL 
728369 (also includes the League of Women Voters) (“Legislative distinctions drawn 
on the bases of sex or pregnancy are inherently dangerous even when they purport to 
confer advantages.”); see also Brief of National Organization for Women et al., supra 
note 167, at 14-20 (arguing that the exceptions that worked to the disadvantage of 
pregnant employees added to the California statute illustrated the “pitfalls” of viewing 
pregnancy as sui generis). 
 170 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 169, at 48-58; Brief for 
Coalition of National Organization for Women, supra note 167 at 4-10, 20-27. 
 171 If this case had been a “normal” sex discrimination case brought by a disabled 
male employee denied leave, this solution would have been the obvious remedy. See 
Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 169, at 3-4. The case was unusual 
in that Cal Fed was seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the interaction of the 
two laws in response to an employee complaint filed under the state law. 
 172 California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 278 (1987). Cal 
Fed’s general disability policy provided time off, but with a rehiring preference rather 
than a job guarantee. Interestingly, California law already required “reasonable 
accommodations” for disabilities (predating the federal analogue by several years), 
and job-protected time off might have been required on those grounds. See generally 
Brief for Lillian Garland as Amici Curiae, California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272 (No. 85-494), 1986 WL 728363 (making this argument). 
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and purpose over the “letter of the statute.”173 The Court reasoned that 
the PDA and the California statute shared a goal of promoting equal 
employment opportunity by permitting “women, as well as men, to 
have families without losing their jobs.”174 The PDA should therefore 
be understood as establishing “a floor beneath which pregnancy 
disability benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above which they may 
not rise.”175 The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the second 
clause of the PDA “means exactly what it says” and accordingly 
“leaves no room for preferential treatment of pregnant workers.”176 
The Court’s decision in Cal Fed permitted “special treatment” in the 
form of pregnancy-specific leaves, and in its wake, a handful of states 
enacted similar maternity leave mandates.177 But the leaders of the East 
Coast feminist establishment (many of whom had helped draft the 
PDA, as well as the amicus briefs in Cal Fed) doubled down on the 
“equal treatment” approach. As Cal Fed was working its way through 
the courts, Howard Berman, the primary sponsor of the California law 
and by then a U.S. Representative, sought to introduce an equivalent 
federal bill guaranteeing maternity leave. Feminist leaders met with 
him and argued forcefully that it would be much better for Congress 
to enact a sex-neutral law that provided leave for a broad range of 
health conditions. They believed this approach would minimize 
backlash against women employees or reification of assumptions that 
childcare was exclusively women’s work, and they began working 
instead on what became the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”).178 
As initially introduced, the FMLA would have covered virtually all 
employers and all employees and provided generous separate periods 
 
 173 Cal Fed, 479 U.S. at 284 (quoting Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 
(1979), which was itself quoting Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 459 (1892)). 
 174 Id. at 289. 
 175 Id. at 285 (internal quotations omitted). The majority also endorsed the 
“leveling up” argument put forward by the “East Coast” feminist briefs. Id. at 290-92. 
Justice Scalia argued this analysis alone was sufficient to show the California statute 
was not preempted and should be been the only basis for the decision. Id. at 295-96 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  
 176 Id. at 297-98 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the proposition 
that benefits could simply be extended to those with other disabilities arguing that 
that would be a “dramatic increase in the scope of state law.” Id. at 302-03. 
 177 See infra text accompanying notes 217-220.  
 178 For a detailed account of the discussions between Representative Berman and 
the feminist leaders, see RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: HOW 
CONGRESS MAKES THE LAW 17-42 (1995).  
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for caretaking and for medical leaves.179 But widespread resistance to 
the bill delayed passage by several years and led to compromises that 
curtailed the length of leaves and limited coverage to relatively large 
employers and to employees who have worked significant hours for at 
least a year.180 The general consensus at the time was that a maternity-
only bill, like the one passed in California, would have been far easier 
to enact.181 Thus, it might well have required fewer concessions 
regarding coverage. This is not to say that feminist leaders’ concerns 
regarding discrimination were unreasonable, or that the broader 
protections provided men and women by the FMLA are insignificant. 
While limited in key respects, the FMLA is very important. It is simply 
that, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify some costs as 
well as benefits of insisting on equal treatment. 
Courts have also failed to develop the robust understanding of 
“equal opportunity” — that is, the right of “women, as well as men, to 
have families without losing their jobs” — endorsed in Cal Fed as a 
justification for providing pregnancy-specific benefits. Rather, the 
Supreme Court has since emphasized the PDA’s “same treatment” 
language. In UAW v. Johnson Controls,182 the Court had to decide 
whether a battery maker could ban all potentially fertile women from 
positions with high levels of lead exposure. Faced with an employer 
policy that relied on an explicit sex-based classification, the Court 
held that the policy violated Title VII because women were just as able 
as men to perform the jobs in question; it “bolstered” its analysis with 
a discussion of the PDA and its commitment to equal treatment.183 
This may well be the correct result, but the Court’s statement of the 
case makes clear that it was comfortable with leveling down, not up. It 
began its substantive discussion with the declaration that: 
 
 179 Id. at 42. 
 180 See infra text accompanying notes 191-192.  
 181 See ELVING, supra note 178, at 38-39 (discussing how early in negotiations over 
the FMLA Representatives Berman, Boxer, and Miler considered “scaling back” to a 
maternity-only bill because the family and medical leave model was too “ambitious” 
and therefore unlikely to pass); JOAN WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: 
WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 118 (2010) (“One prominent feminist confided to me in 
2006 that women’s groups in Washington could have gotten maternity leave a decade 
before the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993.”). 
 182 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 183 Id. at 204. 
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The bias in the case is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile 
women, are given the choice whether they wish to risk their 
reproductive health for a particular job.184 
Women thus won the right to work in a potentially harmful 
workplace. 
For women who were not pregnant, this was a valuable victory 
opening up a class of relatively high paying jobs. But for women or 
men who seek modifications of their workplace to facilitate healthy 
reproduction, Johnson Controls was a loss. It helped establish a thin 
understanding of the promise of the PDA. Lower courts rely on the 
case to deny claims brought by pregnant employees seeking to reduce 
exposure to potentially toxic chemicals or other accommodations to 
increase fetal health.185 
That said, Johnson Controls has untapped potential. The Court in 
Johnson Controls, like the Court in Cal Fed and an earlier decision 
Newport News, drew a distinction between the first and second clauses 
of the PDA and emphasized that the second clause has its own 
substantive force.186 (Tellingly, the Johnson Controls majority cites the 
dissent in Cal Fed for this proposition.187) The Court also deemed it 
irrelevant that the employer’s exclusion of women from positions with 
exposure to lead was primarily motivated by a desire to reduce 
potential fetal harm, and with it potential tort liability, rather than an 
animus against pregnant employees or women more generally.188 And 
it held that it was irrelevant that changing the policy might impose 
costs on the employer, at least in the absence of a showing that costs 
 
 184 Id. at 197. 
 185 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(relying on Johnson Controls in holding that terminating pregnant nurse who refused 
to treat a patient with AIDS because of potential fetal risks did not violate Title VII); 
Duncan v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 702 A.2d 207 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on 
Johnson Controls to deny wrongful termination claim based on forcing pregnant 
employee to take unpaid leave because she had sought transfer to reduce radiation 
exposure to take unpaid leave). But see Asad v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 
772 (N.D. Oh. 2004) (holding employer could have granted pregnant employee’s 
requests to transfer to avoid exposure to fumes without violating PDA).  
 186 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204. The majority characterizes the PDA’s 
comparative language as establishing “a BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] 
standard of its own,” and argues that the dissent improperly ignores the “second 
clause of the Act.” Id. For the Court’s earlier pronouncements on the distinct purposes 
and import of the PDA’s two substantive clauses, see Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n. 14 (1983). 
 187 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204-05. 
 188 See id. at 208-11. 
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would be “so prohibitive as to threaten survival of the business.”189 
Although the context was quite different, these three propositions — 
that the first and second clauses of the PDA are each independently 
important; that the second clause can be violated even if an employer 
is not motivated by discriminatory animus; and that compliance with 
the PDA (as well as Title VII generally) can impose costs on employers 
— offer support for the more robust understanding of the substantive 
right to accommodation that the PDA, properly interpreted, can 
require. 
III. REALIZING THE PDA’S ACCOMMODATION MANDATE 
Cal Fed was a hard case because it required the Court to decide 
whether, contrary to the natural reading of PDA’s text, pregnancy 
could be treated more favorably than other disabilities. Cases in which 
employees with other disabilities are treated more favorably than 
pregnant employees, on the other hand, should be easy. Courts should 
simply apply the PDA’s plain language: employees affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions “shall be treated the same” 
as employees with similar abilities or inabilities to work. This result is 
bolstered by the historical context discussed in Part II. Gilbert was 
itself a failure to accommodate case where the denial of benefits was 
premised on concerns regarding costs. The PDA was enacted to 
overturn it and establish a robust commitment to treating pregnancy 
at least as well as other conditions that place comparable limitations 
on employees. 
But courts routinely permit employers to treat employees with other 
health conditions better than they treat pregnant employees. This 
surprising result stems from courts failing to distinguish between the 
two clauses of the PDA and inappropriately focusing on the presence 
or absence of discriminatory intent when considering claims that 
should be analyzed specifically under the “same treatment” clause. 
This Part first discusses the (limited) range of legal protections, other 
than the PDA, that pregnant employees may use when they seek 
modifications of standard work procedures and then demonstrates 
how courts misinterpret the PDA’s accommodation provision. It 
concludes by proposing a reformulation of accommodation claims 
under the same treatment clause. 
 
 189 Id. at 210-11.  
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A. Non-PDA Accommodation Rights 
As described in Part I, some pregnant employees do not require any 
kind of workplace accommodation. But others may seek to have 
changes made at work or time off from work. Again, some employers 
readily modify workplace practices for pregnant employees, as well as 
providing adequate leave for childbirth and recovery. But many others 
do not. This subpart briefly discusses non-PDA statutory provisions 
that pregnant employees may use to receive accommodations. 
As far as federal law, the most important statute is the FMLA.190 
Employees are eligible for leave under the FMLA if they work for an 
employer with at least 50 employees within a 75 mile radius, and if 
they have worked for that employer for at least one year and at least 
1,250 hours in the year preceding the leave request.191 These 
requirements exclude almost half of the workforce, including 
disproportionately low-income workers.192 The FMLA provides 
employees who do qualify a right to twelve weeks job-guaranteed 
leave, with continuation of benefits, for addressing an employee’s own 
“serious health condition,” for care of an infant, or for care of a family 
member with a serious health condition.193 Thus, eligible employees 
who cannot work during a pregnancy can take FMLA leave, and 
FMLA leave is available for labor, delivery, and the first weeks of 
infant care. 
Even for covered employees, however, the FMLA is often 
inadequate. First, and very importantly, it is unpaid. Second, if 
employers refuse to make necessary accommodations that permit an 
employee to keep working during pregnancy, an employee may feel 
she must take FMLA leave early in a pregnancy, and she may exhaust 
it long before the baby is even born. Even more troubling, reported 
cases suggest that it is common for employers to force certain pregnant 
employees to take FMLA leave. Typically, the scenario unfolds as 
follows. A pregnant employee requests a modification at work that 
could make it safer or more comfortable for her to do her job. The 
employer refuses to make the accommodation and places the employee 
on involuntary FMLA leave, rather than risk potential liability for any 
 
 190 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2653 (2012).  
 191 Id. § 2611(2), (4) (2012). 
 192 See Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of 
Labor’s Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35550, 35622 (2007) (discussing 2005 
data showing 76.1 million of 141.7 million total U.S. employees are eligible); O’Leary, 
supra note 55, at 41-45 (noting that FMLA disproportionately excludes low-wage and 
women workers).  
 193 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012). 
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harm that could occur to the employee or her unborn child. Thus, 
even if the employee would rather continue to work without the 
accommodation so that she could “save” her leave, she is forced to use 
FMLA leave and thus may find herself without a job at all by the time 
the baby is born.194 
The second federal statute that is sometimes relevant to pregnant 
employees seeking accommodations is the ADA. The ADA makes it 
unlawful for employers to discriminate against individuals because of 
a qualifying disability and requires employers to make “reasonable 
accommodations” for the individual unless doing so would impose an 
“undue hardship” on the employer.195 The ADA defines “disability” as 
a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual,” as well as having a record of or 
being regarded as having such an impairment.196 The Supreme Court 
initially interpreted the ADA’s definition of discrimination extremely 
restrictively, making it quite difficult to have a qualifying disability.197 
In 2008, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act to override 
these decisions. The ADA Amendments Act retained the substantive 
definition of disability, but it instructed that the standard was to be 
“construed in favor of broad coverage” and explicitly repudiated the 
Court’s prior interpretations.198 The ADA Amendments Act also listed 
(again to supersede more restrictive judicial interpretations) “major 
life” activities that could qualify, a list that includes “walking, 
standing, lifting, bending . . . [and] working.”199 The EEOC’s 
 
 194 See, e.g., Harvender v. Norton Co., No. 96-CV-653 (LEK/RWS), 1997 WL 
793085, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1997) (pregnant laboratory technician placed on 
involuntary FMLA leave after requesting light duty position to reduce exposure to 
chemicals); see also Cox, supra note 11, at 454-58 (discussing problem of pregnant 
employees placed on involuntary FMLA leaves). 
 195 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). The reasonable accommodation provision 
is part of the statutory definition of “discriminate,” a recognition that a failure to 
change existing structures can be a form of discrimination. See supra text 
accompanying notes 59-63. 
 196 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). 
 197 See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1999), superseded by statute 
ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. 110-325 (2008); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-97 (2002), superseded by statute ADA Amendments Act, 
Pub. L. 110-325 (2008).  
 198 ADA Amendments Act §§ 2, 4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(iii) (2012) 
(“[T]he threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life 
activity should not demand extensive analysis.”). 
 199 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). The definition also specifies that substantial 
limitation of “major bodily function[s], including . . . reproductive functions” may 
qualify, but this language has generally been limited in its applicability to infertility or 
significant pregnancy complications, where it is clear that the “reproductive 
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regulations implementing the new statute emphasize that even 
relatively temporary disabilities — that is, those expected to last less 
than six months — can meet this statutory definition.200 An EEOC 
commissioner has explained that the proper inquiry is whether, in the 
moment the impairment is experienced, the individual is 
“substantially limited” in his or her ability to perform a major life 
activity.201 Applying the amended ADA, courts have held, for example, 
that a relatively vague reference to a “back injury” making it difficult 
to stand for long periods,202 an ankle injury making it difficult to stand 
more than an hour or walk more than a half mile,203 and 
gastrointestinal problems causing vomiting and diarrhea204 could be 
qualifying disabilities. 
Neither the original ADA nor the ADA Amendments Act speaks 
directly to whether pregnancy may be a qualifying disability. Courts 
interpreting the ADA prior to the 2008 amendments consistently held 
that “normal” pregnancy was not a disability.205 They generally 
reasoned either that “normal” pregnancy was not an “impairment,” or 
that, even if it were, it was too transient to qualify.206 Under this case 
law, employees with very serious complications — e.g., premature 
labor resulting in early and extended bed rest — could sometimes use 
the ADA to receive accommodations from their employers.207 But 
routine pregnancy limitations such as morning sickness or limitations 
 
functions” themselves are impaired.  
 200 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(ix) (2013). 
 201 Chai Feldblum, EEOC, ABA Webcast: EEOC Commissioners Explain Final 
ADAAA Regulations (May 4, 2011). 
 202 Josey v. Wal-Mart, No. 0:11–2993–CMC–SHV, 2012 WL 527532, *11-12 (D. 
S.C. Feb. 16, 2012). 
 203 Fleck v. WILMAC Corp., No. 10–05562, 2011 WL 1899198, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 
19, 2011). 
 204 Wells v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 860 F. Supp. 2d 469, 480 (S.D. 
Ohio 2012) (“The gastrointestinal problems which caused Plaintiff nausea, vomiting, 
and diarrhea clearly qualify as a physiological disorder.”). Because this case was 
decided under the “regarded as” prong, the court did not need to determine whether 
this impairment substantially limited a major life activity, but it seems likely that it 
would suffice.  
 205 See, e.g., Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. 
Tex. 1995) (stating that absent unusual circumstances, pregnancy is not a physical 
impairment under the ADA). 
 206 See, e.g., Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 
1996) (“Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder. Being the 
natural consequence of a properly functioning reproductive system, pregnancy cannot 
be called an impairment.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997) 
(finding premature labor might qualify as an ADA disability).  
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on lifting were consistently held to be insufficient, as were often more 
serious complications.208 
As Jeannette Cox explains, the ADA Amendments Act provides 
significant support for reconsidering this line between “normal” 
pregnancies and pregnancy complications.209 The statutory language 
provides that “impairments” that cause “substantial” limitations in 
“walking, standing, lifting, [or] bending” qualify. At least in the later 
stages of pregnancy, many women experience substantial limitations 
in their ability to perform such tasks when compared to the general 
population. If, as the EEOC suggests in an appendix to the 
regulations, an individual with a back injury who cannot lift heavy 
weights for a several months qualifies as an individual with a 
“disability,”210 a pregnant employee who is similarly “substantially 
limited” in the “major life activity” of “lifting” should too, even if the 
limitation is the result of a “normal” pregnancy rather than a 
diagnosed pregnancy complication. The textual and normative 
arguments that Professor Cox makes regarding the ADA are bolstered 
by the history of the PDA recounted above. Prior to the enactment of 
PDA, some courts similarly distinguished between “normal” 
pregnancies and “pregnancy complications” in applying temporary 
disability statutes or private employers’ policies.211 The PDA, however, 
roundly rejected this reasoning, and since its enactment, employers, 
insurance companies, and courts have routinely accepted that even 
“normal” pregnancies cause “disabilities” when applying temporary 
disability policies. 
I generally find Professor Cox’s arguments quite persuasive. Courts, 
however, may be unlikely to follow her approach, especially because 
the EEOC reaffirmed the distinction between “normal” pregnancies 
and those with complications. The appendix accompanying the new 
regulations still flatly states that pregnancy is not an impairment but 
 
 208 Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4, 2010 WL 1568606, at *16 
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010), aff’d 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding even pregnancy 
with complications to be too transient to qualify). 
 209 See Cox, supra note 11, at 444-45. When the ADA was first enacted, some other 
commentators made similar arguments that pregnancy should be recognized as a 
disability under the ADA. E.g., Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 668-78 (1999); Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and 
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993).  
 210 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(viii-ix) (2012). 
 211 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing California’s 
interpretation of the statute at issue in Geduldig). 
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that complications of pregnancy may be,212 as does the EEOC’s 
“Questions and Answers” on the regulations.213 Even more troubling, 
at least some courts deciding cases after the effective date of the ADA 
Amendments Act have denied disability claims in pregnancy cases that 
include serious complications, relying on pre-ADA amendment case 
law and not even considering whether the amendments should change 
the analysis.214 
The reluctance expressed by courts and the EEOC to classifying 
“normal” pregnancy as a “disability” may also reflect a deeper reality 
that there is something unsettling about calling pregnancy a disability. 
Pregnancy is an integral part of women’s role in human reproduction. 
It is only a “disability” if men are the norm against which ability is 
considered. But as Professor Cox points out, the same is true of other 
conditions that are more classically recognized as “disabilities.”215 The 
insight of the social model of disability, which underlies the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation mandate, is that all disabilities are in some 
sense socially constructed. That is, in a society in which all buildings 
are no more than one story, individuals in wheelchairs need far fewer 
accommodations. Similarly, in a society in which all employees have a 
generous period of job-protected leave from work, pregnant 
employees need far fewer accommodations. 
In fact, pregnancy illustrates this theoretical concept well. A 
“normal” pregnancy will generally not interfere with the ability of a 
secretary to do her job, but it might well interfere with the ability of a 
construction worker to do her job. This realization should help 
 
 212 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2012).  
 213 Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2012) (asking if pregnancy is a disability at Question 23).  
 214 See, e.g., Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-CV-4938, 2012 WL 
2244325, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (relying exclusively on pre-ADA 
Amendments Act pregnancy cases to dismiss with leave to replead disability claim by 
employee who developed chronic cholecystitis following pregnancy); Selkow v. 7-
Eleven, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-456-T-33EAJ, 2012 WL 2054872, at *14 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 
2012) (denying disability claim by pregnant employee whose doctor had advised that 
she limit heavy lifting, relying exclusively on pre-ADA Amendments Act cases and 
failing to mention the amendments). But see Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-
CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012) (finding that woman who 
suffered from “premature uterine contractions, irritation of the uterus, increased heart 
rate, severe morning sickness, severe pelvic bone pains, severe back pain, severe lower 
abdominal pain, extreme headaches and other pregnancy-related conditions” stated a 
claim under the amended ADA). For discussion of how pregnancy complication cases 
should be analyzed under the amended ADA, see Williams, Accommodations for 
Pregnancy-Related Conditions, supra note 12, at 9-17. 
 215 See Cox, supra note 11, at 478-80. 
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address the discomfort that many express with labeling pregnancy a 
“disability.” Nonetheless, the analysis of the PDA discussed in the 
following sections has promise in part precisely because it lets 
employers, and ultimately courts, sidestep the charged issue of 
whether a “normal” pregnancy is a “disability” by clarifying that 
because the limitations pregnancy causes are like those caused by 
ADA-accommodated disabilities, they must be accommodated like 
ADA-accommodated disabilities. 
Beyond the FMLA and the ADA, federal law offers little recourse to 
pregnant employees seeking workplace support.216 Some states, 
however, offer more robust protections.217 Most concern job-
guaranteed leave or income protections that go beyond the FMLA. 
Five states provide temporary disability benefits for all short-term 
disabilities including pregnancy (as per the PDA); one state requires 
employers to provide paid sick days for many employees.218 Two states 
provide paid family leave, usable by women or men, for care of a 
newborn child.219 At least eleven states mandate job-guaranteed 
maternity or sex-neutral parenting leaves that cover smaller employers 
or provide longer leaves than the FMLA does.220 
 
 216 Two other statutes that may potentially be relevant are the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012), which regulates exposure to workplace 
toxins and hazards, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012), 
which was recently amended to require employers provide many employees 
reasonable break time for expressing breast milk. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012). 
 217 For helpful overviews, see NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, 
EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS THAT HELP NEW PARENTS (2d ed. 
May 2012), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Expecting_ 
Better_Report.pdf?docID=10301; National Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Adoption Leave Statutes, NSCL.ORG, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/maternity-leave-state-statutes.aspx (last 
updated Feb. 2009).  
 218 See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2625-2630 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-
21 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-25 (West 2012); N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 
201(9)(B) (McKinney 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-39-1 (West 2012); 2012 Conn. 
Pub. Acts 11-52. 
 219 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11B-1 (West 
2013). Washington has also enacted paid family leave legislation but implementation 
has been delayed until 2015. See S.B. 5091, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).  
 220 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-6 
(West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6(2)(e) (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
23:341 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-2-310 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(VI)(b) (West 2013); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 659A.162 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-408 (West 2012); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (West 2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-30-020 (West 2013). 
Several states also provide parenting leaves that far exceed the FMLA for state 
employees. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.20.305 (West 2013) (eighteen weeks); 
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A few states require workplace modifications that can help a 
pregnant employee continue working. California, Connecticut, and 
Louisiana require employers to transfer pregnant employees to less 
strenuous or hazardous positions or make other workplace 
accommodations under certain circumstances.221 Illinois and Texas 
have more specific provisions relating to law enforcement and 
firefighting.222 And many states have enacted language that largely 
parallels the PDA, and thus provides a similar comparative right to 
accommodation, but reaches employers that are too small to be 
covered by the PDA.223 
B. Adverse Employment Actions Based on Pregnancy 
Part I illustrates that pregnant employees may face two distinct, 
though often interrelated or overlapping, challenges: adverse actions 
based on bias or stereotypes about pregnancy and the failure to make 
necessary accommodations. This subsection shows that courts handle 
straightforward claims challenging discriminatory adverse actions 
reasonably well (or, at least as well as in other Title VII contexts). The 
next subsections argue that courts err, however, when deciding cases 
concerning failure to make accommodations by improperly focusing on 
the existence or absence of discriminatory intent. But before addressing 
either type of claim, it is essential to parse more carefully the statutory 
language of the PDA and how it fits into Title VII as a whole. 
 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 19991.6 (West 2012) (one year). Illinois also provides paid leave 
to state employees who can prove they received prenatal care. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, 
§ 303.130 (West 2013). 
 221 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945(a)(3) (West 2012) (requiring employers to provide 
“reasonable accommodations” for pregnant employees pursuant to medical advice and 
to transfer a pregnant employee who requests a transfer to a “less strenuous or 
hazardous position” if the employer regularly transfers other temporarily disabled 
employees or, even if not, if it can be “reasonably accommodated”); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46a-60(a)(7) (West 2013) (employers must “make a reasonable effort to transfer a 
pregnant employee to a suitable temporary position if continued employment in the 
employee’s current position may cause injury to the employee or fetus”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:341-342 (West 2012) (employers must transfer a pregnant employee 
who requests a transfer to a “less strenuous or hazardous position” if the employer 
regularly transfers other temporarily disabled employees or, even if not, if it can be 
“reasonably accommodated”). 
 222 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(H) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
411.0079 (West 2011). 
 223 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (West 2012) (PDA-like language applied to all 
employers with at least one employee). 
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Recall that the substantive language of the PDA is as follows: 
[S]ection 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: 
“(k) The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected 
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of this title 
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. . . . [Sentence 
addressing abortion omitted.]” 
As instructed by Congress, all of the language in the quotation marks 
above is codified as part of Title VII’s definitions.224 
But only the clause before the first semicolon — stating that the 
terms “because of sex” and “on the basis of sex” include pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions — “reads” like a normal 
definition, and, like a normal definition, it does not contain its own 
substantive requirements. The first clause gains force from Title VII’s 
more general substantive provisions: the prohibition on employers 
“refus[ing] to hire, discharg[ing], or discriminat[ing] against” an 
individual “because of . . . sex” and “limiting, segregating, or classifying 
employees” in a way that would deprive individuals of employment 
opportunities “because of . . . sex,”225 as clarified by provisions added to 
Title VII in 1991 concerning policies with a disparate impact226 or 
decisions based on a mix of legitimate or illegitimate practices.227 The 
provided definition — “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions” — can comfortably be “substituted” into any of these 
substantive prohibitions in place of “sex.” 
The second clause is different. It proscribes that “women affected by 
pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes” as other employees “similar in their ability or inability to 
work.” This substantive phrase cannot be “substituted” in for sex in 
the disparate treatment, mixed motive, or disparate impact provisions. 
That would result in grammatically incoherent directives. Rather, the 
 
 224 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 225 Id. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 226 Id. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
 227 Id. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
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second clause is itself a distinct substantive standard that applies 
specifically to pregnancy. Moreover, as opposed to a prohibition on 
discriminatory adverse actions — that is, setting forth what employers 
may not do — the second clause of the PDA places an affirmative 
obligation on employers. They shall treat pregnant employees the 
same as other employees with similar abilities. 
The PDA’s rather peculiar structure reflects some of the particular 
challenges implicit in drafting overrides of judicial opinions. First, the 
political considerations differ from those at play in enacting “new” 
statutes. For example, in the PDA’s case, it was expedient to avoid 
“opening up” Title VII beyond the addition of a single definition to 
minimize the risk that legislators hostile to Title VII would seek to use 
the new bill as a vehicle for amendments that would weaken the 
overall statute.228 Second, if the override suggests a plausible 
interpretation of the preexisting text, as the PDA did, it is in some 
sense superfluous and can be difficult to “fit” into the statutes.229 
Notably, Title VII’s requirement that employers accommodate 
religious practices, which was also enacted to supersede narrow 
judicial interpretations, is likewise housed in the statute’s definitional 
provisions.230 Courts recognize, however, that the religion definition 
creates a substantive entitlement to accommodations that calls for a 
different form of analysis than employed in a typical disparate 
treatment or disparate impact claims.231 
Overrides also often try to both supersede a specific decision and to 
anticipate and address other similar issues that are likely arise 
(although they frequently fail in this latter objective).232 In the PDA’s 
case, as the committee reports and floor statements make clear, and as 
 
 228 See supra text accompanying note 146.  
 229 See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 562-66 
(2009) [hereinafter Shadow Precedents] (discussing challenges in drafting overrides); 
see also Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem 
in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 929-33 (2012) [hereinafter 
Undermining Congressional Overrides] (discussing the challenge that adding language 
to statutes to supersede judicial interpretations can cause when interpreting similar 
language in other statutes). 
 230 Equal Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); see also Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 167-
68 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing the impetus for enactment of this amendment). 
 231 See, e.g., Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 281 & n.12 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“[E]mployees may assert two theories of religious discrimination: 
‘disparate treatment’ . . . and ‘failure to accommodate.’”). 
 232 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 229, at 542-56 (providing several 
examples ongoing reliance on overridden precedents). 
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the Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged, Congress did not 
seek to supersede only the specific holding of Gilbert that pregnancy 
could be excluded from temporary disability plans. Rather, Congress 
sought to express its disapproval of the test of discrimination 
employed in the case and to ensure that, in any employment-related 
context, pregnancy was treated at least as favorably as other conditions 
that caused similar limitations.233 Congress’s success in achieving these 
larger goals has been incomplete. As I discuss elsewhere, courts 
continue to rely on the test of discrimination announced by the Court 
in Gilbert in contexts not directly addressed by the PDA’s “pregnancy, 
childbirth, and related medical conditions” language, such as 
expressing breast milk.234 And, as the next section will show, courts 
have failed to apply consistently the mandate of accommodation in 
contexts outside the temporary disability context. 
That said, the definitional structure Congress employed works well 
when applied to classic intentional discrimination cases challenging 
employment decisions based on unwarranted bias or stereotypes about 
pregnancy. A plaintiff in such a case alleges that an adverse act, such 
as a termination or denial of a promotion, was motivated by her 
pregnancy. The PDA’s first clause establishes that “because of sex” 
includes “because of pregnancy.” Her case then proceeds like any 
other Title VII case alleging intentional discrimination, known as a 
disparate treatment in employment discrimination parlance, with the 
only difference being that she will present evidence of bias related to 
pregnancy in lieu of or addition to evidence of bias related to sex. 
(Note, my focus here is on cases in which the plaintiff alleges she was 
doing her job adequately. If pregnancy was actually interfering with an 
employee’s ability to meet the standard expectations of her job, the 
case would be more appropriately analyzed as a failure to 
accommodate case that led to an adverse action, an issue I discuss in 
the next sub-part.) 
In some instances, rather common when the PDA was enacted but 
now rather rare, an employer may openly admit that the challenged 
action was based on the employee’s pregnancy, in which case the 
analysis would focus on whether being non-pregnant is a “bona fide 
occupational qualification,” a defense the statute permits.235 More 
commonly, however, the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence 
that the action at issue was motivated at least in part by her 
 
 233 See supra text accompanying notes 160-163; see also Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983). 
 234 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 229, at 551-56. 
 235 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). 
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pregnancy. In most such cases, courts follow a burden shifting proof 
structure initially set forth in a race discrimination case, McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green.236 In the first step, a plaintiff must show that she is a 
member of a protected class (pregnant women); that she was qualified 
for the job; that she was subject to an adverse act; and that there is a 
nexus between the pregnancy and the adverse action.237 If a plaintiff 
makes out this prima facie case, an employer must articulate a 
“legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale” for the challenged act. If it is 
a termination case, the legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale is 
usually some kind of performance problem. If it is a failure to hire or 
promote case, the nondiscriminatory rationale is usually that a 
different candidate was more qualified. Assuming that the employer 
provides a legitimate rationale, the plaintiff ultimately can prevail only 
if she persuades the fact-finder that pregnancy was at least a 
“motivating factor” in the decision.238 This is most often done through 
establishing that the employer’s claimed justification was pretextual.239 
The Supreme Court has stated that the burden shifting process of 
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is helpful because “once the 
employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well 
be the most likely alternative explanation.”240 The lynchpin of the 
analysis is thus the pretext analysis. If the evidence establishes the 
employer’s non-discriminatory justification was in fact the prime 
motivation for the decision at issue, the plaintiff loses (or at least is 
ineligible for many remedies) because she has not established that the 
adverse action was “because of” her sex.241 The most common way to 
establish pretext is to provide comparators. For example, consider a 
pregnant employee who is terminated right before she is due to start 
maternity leave. The employer claims its legitimate reason for 
 
 236 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 237 E.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000). 
Courts sometimes suggest a plaintiff must identify a similarly situated employee 
treated more favorably to make out even the prima facie case. E.g., Serednyj v. Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 552 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 238 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
 239 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143-48 (2000). 
 240 Id. at 147; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) 
(“[I]n the absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that those 
actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations.”). 
 241 If the case were analyzed as a “mixed-motive” case, the plaintiff could establish 
liability by showing that her pregnancy was at least a “motivating factor” in the 
employer’s decision; however, a showing by the employer that it would have taken the 
same action regardless would limit damages and injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(m) (2012); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).  
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terminating the employee was that she was tardy frequently. The 
employee claims she was terminated because she was pregnant and 
her boss did not expect her to return after her leave. Evidence that 
other employees with similar tardiness records were not terminated 
would tend to establish that the employer’s proffered justification was 
pretextual and support an inference that the true cause was her 
pregnancy. Theoretically, a plaintiff should be able to present other 
kinds of evidence that would suggest bias, such as evidence that a 
decision-maker believed pregnant employees were generally 
incompetent or unreliable, and some courts have held that 
discrimination claims can succeed even in the absence of 
comparators.242 As a practical matter, however, courts often require 
comparators and will dismiss a case or grant summary judgment if a 
plaintiff lacks them.243 
In most cases challenging an adverse employment action allegedly 
based on bias or stereotypes, courts never even mention the second 
clause of the PDA. They simply reference the first definitional clause 
— discrimination because of pregnancy is discrimination because of 
sex — and then proceed with standard disparate treatment analysis.244 
However, to the extent a court were to consider the second clause of 
the PDA — the mandate that pregnant employees be treated the 
“same” as other employees “similar in their ability or inability to 
work” — it would neither add to nor detract from the analysis a court 
employs under McDonnell Douglas. In a case challenging an adverse 
employment action, the legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale will 
also almost always relate to work performance.245 (As we will see in 
 
 242 See generally Williams, Accommodations for Pregnancy-Related Conditions, supra 
note 12 (discussing this issue and gathering case law). 
 243 The facts above are based on a Seventh Circuit decision authored by Judge 
Posner which has been extraordinarily influential. In Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 
F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff was fired one day before her maternity leave 
was due to begin, allegedly for tardiness (which she said was related to morning 
sickness). Even though the timing was very suspicious and there were biased 
comments made by her supervisor, the court held that in the absence of comparators, 
she could not succeed. Id. at 738-39.  
 244 See, e.g., McGuire v. Brinker Fla., Inc., No. 8:08-CV-25-T-33EAJ, 2009 WL 
860618, *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2009) (“The analysis applied to pregnancy 
discrimination cases is the same as analysis in other Title VII sex discrimination 
cases.”). 
 245 See, e.g., id. at *10 (restaurant alleges waitress was fired because of tardiness 
and customer complaints). The one common exception would be a termination that 
an employer alleges is a layoff motivated by cost cutting concerns but an employee 
alleges is motivated by discriminatory animus. Courts typically try to determine 
whether it was a “real” layoff by looking to see, for example, whether the position was 
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the next section, this is not true in most accommodation cases. There, 
the legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale is more often cost concerns 
or compliance with statutory mandates.) Thus, in an adverse action 
case, the affirmative obligation in the second clause is simply the 
converse of the comparator analysis applied under McDonnell Douglas. 
If an employer really does treat the pregnant employee “the same” as 
other employees with similar performance records, it will have 
complied with the PDA’s mandate in the second clause and also likely 
won its case under McDonnell Douglas. 
Commentators and courts have developed numerous critiques of the 
dominance of the McDonnell Douglas test in employment 
discrimination doctrine generally.246 As the example above makes 
clear, it places enormous emphasis on identifying similarly-situated 
comparators, which can be extraordinarily difficult in many 
workplaces.247 It does not address structural aspects of employment 
that tend to exclude certain classes of workers.248 It tends to discount 
the significance of “stray comments” that are “remote” from the 
challenged decision, even though these might suggest individual bias, 
implicit bias, harassment, or a workplace that tolerates discriminatory 
attitudes.249 There is widespread confusion regarding whether and how 
it applies if a challenged action may have been based on a mix of 
legitimate and illegitimate actions.250 All of these criticisms apply to 
 
truly eliminated. This same analysis would be appropriate in a pregnancy case.  
 246 For a prominent judicial critique, see Brady v. Office of Sergeant of Arms, 520 
F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he prima facie case [aspect of McDonnell Douglas] 
is a largely unnecessary sideshow, . . . spawning enormous confusion and wasting 
litigant and judicial resources.”); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 862-63 
(7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., with Tinder, J., and Hamilton, J., concurring) (similar). 
 247 See generally, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE 
L.J. 728 (2011) (arguing that comparators are too heavily relied upon by courts in 
assessing alleged discrimination).  
 248 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) (examining proposals for a 
structural approach to employment discrimination law); Tristin Green, Discrimination 
in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003) (proposing a conceptual foundation for a structural 
approach to employment discrimination). 
 249 See, e.g., Linda H. Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination 
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006) (arguing for 
the application of behavioral realism to the problem of defining and identifying 
discriminatory motivation); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011) (arguing for a focus on statutory language rather than 
frameworks to allow more realistic assessment of various forms that discriminatory 
actions can take).  
 250 See generally, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price 
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pregnancy cases. However, when used in a case challenging an adverse 
action allegedly based on pregnancy, McDonnell Douglas is not 
particularly worse in the pregnancy context than in any other context. 
C. PDA Accommodation Claims 
Cases challenging the denial of a request for some kind of workplace 
modification are different from cases challenging an adverse 
employment action. As noted above, they stem from a denial of a 
request from an employee that standard workplace procedures be 
modified in her favor — such as that she receive a transfer to a light 
duty position, relief from a lifting requirement, access to a seat, or 
excused time off from work. That said, the issue often arises 
intertwined with an adverse employment action, if, after the denial of 
the request, the plaintiff is terminated for failure to perform her job 
adequately251 or placed on FMLA-leave or other unpaid leave.252 
Notably, in this instance, the adverse employment action may be based 
on unbiased application of “legitimate,” or at least standard, job 
expectations, and the preceding denial of accommodations may be 
based on cost-based concerns or other pregnancy-neutral factors. But 
the presence or absence of bias should not determine the outcome of a 
PDA claim. The PDA’s same treatment language requires that courts 
also conduct a separate — often far more straightforward — inquiry: 
Has the employer made comparable accommodations for other 
employees? This sub-part demonstrates that EEOC guidance frames 
this question properly, but that courts have failed to follow this 
guidance. The next sub-part discusses in more detail how I contend 
accommodation claims should be analyzed. 
Although, as noted above, the EEOC does not consider “normal” 
pregnancy to be a disability for ADA purposes,253 the agency has long 
interpreted the comparative language in the PDA to require a 
potentially broad range of accommodations, including modification of 
job responsibilities. Six months after the PDA was enacted, the EEOC 
reaffirmed its pre-existing guidance indicating that limitations caused 
 
Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004) 
(analyzing the potential effect of Desert Palace on the McDonnell Douglas line of cases).  
 251 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(pregnant certified nursing assistant terminated after request for light duty position 
denied). 
 252 See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(pregnant airline worker placed on paid and then unpaid leave after request for light 
duty position was denied). 
 253 See supra text accompanying notes 212-213. 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
2013] Gilbert Redux 1019 
by pregnancy generally should be treated as temporary disabilities.254 
It also issued an explanatory “Questions and Answers” document that 
it published as an appendix to the guidance.255 This appendix remains 
fully in force today. One question is particularly helpful. It asks 
whether an employer has to provide an “alternative job” if an 
employee, “for pregnancy-related reasons . . . is unable to perform the 
functions of her job.”256 The EEOC answer states: 
An employer is required to treat an employee temporarily 
unable to perform the functions of her job because of her 
pregnancy-related condition in the same manner as it treats 
other temporarily disabled employees, whether by providing 
modified tasks, alternative assignments, disability leaves, leaves 
without pay, etc. For example, a woman’s primary job function 
may be the operation of a machine, and, incidental to that 
function, she may carry materials to and from the machine. If 
other employees temporarily unable to lift are relieved of these 
functions, pregnant employees also unable to lift must be 
temporarily relieved of the function.257 
Notably, the EEOC’s answer makes no reference to the reason why an 
employer might relieve another employee of lifting responsibilities — 
which would often include light duty policies intended to limit 
workers’ compensation payments258 — suggesting this factor is 
irrelevant to the analysis. The EEOC confirmed this analysis in 
guidance issued in 2007, again asserting that if an employer had 
modified work requirements for an employee with a hernia or an 
injured arm, it would need to likewise accommodate pregnancy.259 
In its original Q&A on the PDA, the EEOC also made clear that 
employers located in states with laws that mandated temporary 
disability payments, but permitted pregnancy to be treated less 
favorably than other temporary disabilities, would need to begin 
 
 254 See supra text accompanying note 127.  
 255 44 Fed. Reg. 23804 (Apr. 20, 1979) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604.10). 
 256 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 app. Question 5 (2013).  
 257 Id. (emphasis added). Note that since the ADA Amendments Act, the EEOC has 
been clear that even “temporary” disabilities can qualify for ADA accommodations. 
See supra text accompanying notes 200-201.  
 258 See supra text accompanying note 94.  
 259 EEOC, No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance, Unlawful Disparate Treatment of 
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/caregiving.html (providing, in Example 12, an illustration of an 
employer’s unlawful refusal to modify a pregnant employee’s duties).  
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
1020 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:961 
providing comparable benefits for pregnancy.260 In such instances, 
many employers would probably have asserted — truthfully — that 
their failure to cover pregnancy in a temporary disability policy was 
not due to animus against pregnant employees but rather due to a 
desire to save money by providing the minimum benefits required by 
law. The EEOC’s answer suggests that the absence of bias against 
pregnant employees would be irrelevant to the analysis. Pregnant 
employees would need to be treated “the same” as other employees 
with comparable limitations. 
The EEOC’s conclusions are not surprising. They accord with the 
PDA’s plain language. Moreover, the Q&A was developed just months 
after the PDA was enacted. As noted above, the House committee 
report explicitly indicated that the PDA could require transferring 
pregnant employees to light duty positions.261 It was equally clear that 
Congress intended to prohibit both states and private employers from 
treating pregnancy less generously than other disabilities under 
temporary disability policies.262 
Courts, however, have generally not followed the EEOC’s lead on 
this issue.263 Rather, they have employed standard disparate treatment 
or disparate impact analysis.264 The most extensively litigated fact 
pattern is a pregnant employee seeking a light duty position on the 
 
 260 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 app. Question 19 (2011).  
 261 See supra text accompanying note 161.  
 262 See supra text accompanying note 163. 
 263 Even if such materials do not merit full “Chevron” deference, see Chevron v. 
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), they at least deserve careful 
consideration. See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).  
 264 Disparate impact requires showing that the policy disproportionately 
disadvantages pregnant employees and is not job-related and consistent with 
“business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). Disparate impact should be a 
powerful tool for challenging any of a variety of employment policies that make it 
difficult for pregnant employees to work. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment 
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1984) 
(explaining generally why disparate impact claims based on pregnancy should be 
viable as a means of challenging facially neutral policies such as no-leave policies). 
Siegel explores the putative tension between the first and second clauses of the PDA 
with respect to disparate impact and argues that disparate impact claims should be 
cognizable. Id. at 937-40. I agree. In line with the Court’s holding in Cal Fed, the 
second clause should be interpreted as providing a floor beneath which benefits 
cannot fall, not a ceiling on disparate impact analysis. See text accompanying note 
175. In practice, however, courts have been quite hostile to disparate impact claims in 
the pregnancy context. See Dinner, supra note 16, at 485-90 (discussing and critiquing 
recent pregnancy disparate impact cases); Grossman, supra note 12, at 615-19 (same); 
Grossman & Thomas, supra note 12, at 41-49 (same).  
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ground that individuals with other health conditions have been 
granted light duty.265 Courts typically focus their analysis on the 
employer’s rationale for denying the pregnant employee’s request. If an 
employer sometimes offers light duty or other modified work to 
employees with non-work-related injuries, several circuits (in what are 
now relatively old cases) have suggested a PDA claim may succeed.266 
And two recent district court cases held that a policy of limiting light 
duty to workplace injuries could state a successful disparate impact 
claim.267 But most courts have held that if the employer consistently 
makes light duty positions available only to employees injured on the 
job, no PDA violation exists.268 The rationale embraced in these cases 
is that a light-duty policy that distinguishes between on-the-job and 
off-the-job injuries is “pregnancy blind,” and thus not direct evidence 
of discrimination.269 Courts then typically use McDonnell Douglas 
burden shifting to assess whether the policy is a “pretext for 
discrimination against pregnant women.”270 So long as the employer 
regularly limits the policy to on-the-job injuries, courts routinely deny 
the claim. 
 
 265 For a detailed discussion and similar critique of these cases, see Grossman & 
Thomas, supra note 12, at 36-39. 
 266 See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1198-99 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1227 (6th Cir. 1996); Adams v. 
Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, 
Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 946 (10th Cir. 1992). Ensley-Gaines suggests that it is generally 
inappropriate to exclude employees injured on-the-job as potential comparators for 
PDA claims. 100 F.3d at 1226. A more recent Sixth Circuit case, however, seems to 
reject this analysis, characterizing Ensley-Gaines as concerned “primarily” with 
whether a prima facie case had been established and deeming it to hold no relevance 
to pretext analysis regarding a light-duty policy limited to on-the-job injuries. Reeves 
v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 267 See Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 WL 1514513, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009); Lochren v. Suffolk, No. 01CV03925, 2006 WL 6850118 
(June 14, 2006) (verdict sheet). Notably, in both cases there was also evidence of 
discriminatory animus sufficient to support a disparate treatment claim.  
 268 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 11-2078, 2013 WL 93132, at *7-9 
(4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 
(7th Cir. 2011); Reeves, 446 F.3d at 642; Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 
1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 
(5th Cir. 1998). 
 269 E.g., Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548-49; Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641 (“Reeves cannot 
avoid summary judgment at stage three unless a rational juror could find that ‘the 
employer intended to discriminate against the protected group.’”) (emphasis added by 
the Reeves court) (internal quotation omitted). 
 270 Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added); see also Reeves, 446 F.3d at 642.  
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The Fifth Circuit, for example, characterized an employer’s refusal 
to provide a light duty position to a pregnant employee as permissible 
because it treated her “in exactly the same manner as it would have 
treated any other worker who was injured off the job.”271 The Eleventh 
Circuit similarly held that the employer was “entitled to deny [the 
pregnant employee] a modified duty assignment as long as it denied 
modified duty assignments to all employees who were not injured on 
the job.”272 If courts utilize McDonnell Douglas to reach this 
conclusion, they do so in a way that assumes that light-duty policies 
limited to on-the-job injuries are per se permissible. To make out even 
a prima facie case, courts often require employees identify other 
individuals who have received workplace accommodations for out-of-
work injuries or medical conditions.273 Even if courts employ a more 
liberal approach to the prima facie case, a light duty policy limited to 
on-the-job injuries is deemed a legitimate “nondiscriminatory” 
rationale, unless there is evidence suggesting it was adopted as a cover 
for intentional discrimination against pregnant employees.274 
The oft-repeated refrain in these cases is that the PDA “requires” 
employers “ignore a female employee’s pregnancy,”275 and that 
granting a light duty request would be “preferential treatment” which 
the PDA does not require.276 It is essential to recognize that these 
conclusions rest (incorrectly, I contend) on the assumption that the 
appropriate baseline for consideration is an employer’s treatment of 
non-work-related injuries. As discussed more fully in the following 
sub-part, nothing in the PDA’s text permits circumscribing 
comparators in this matter. The statute requires that employers’ 
treatment of pregnant employees be compared to their treatment of all 
employees “similar in their ability to work or not work,” not all 
employees similar in the cause of their ability to work or not work. 
Accordingly, if an employer routinely allows employees injured at 
work to go on light duty, similarly accommodating pregnancy is not 
 
 271 Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206. 
 272 Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313. 
 273 See, e.g., Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 551 (discounting a potential comparator for 
establishing a prima facie case on grounds that she suffered a work-related injury). But 
see EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.7 (10th Cir. 
2000) (permitting comparison to employee injured on-the-job to suffice for the prima 
facie case).  
 274 Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641 n.1; Horizon/CMS Healthcare, 220 F.3d at 1195 n.7. 
 275 E.g., Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548; Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313. 
 276 E.g., Reeves, 446 F.3d at 642 (quoting Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208); Spivey, 196 
F.3d at 1312.  
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“preferential treatment” — it is simply the “same treatment” mandated 
by the PDA.277 
That said, until recently, courts at least suggested consistently that a 
claim under the PDA could succeed if a plaintiff showed an employer 
accommodated non-work-related injuries but did not accommodate 
pregnancy.278 A few recent cases, however, circumscribe the class of 
potential comparators even more. These cases have suggested that 
employees accommodated pursuant to the ADA’s statutory mandate — 
that is, accommodation of medical impairments that usually occur 
“off-the-job” — are similarly inapposite as comparators for PDA 
purposes. The most extensive discussion of the issue is a recent 
Fourth Circuit decision, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.279 The case 
was brought by an employee who sought accommodations for a 
limitation on her ability to lift more than twenty pounds during her 
pregnancy. UPS refused on the ground that such accommodations 
were only available to employees who were injured on the job or who 
had ADA-qualifying disabilities.280 Young claimed this violated the 
PDA.281 Relying heavily on the light duty cases discussed above, the 
court concluded that granting accommodations to Young would be 
unfair “preferential treatment,” relative to other individuals with 
temporary lifting restrictions due to out-of-work activities. (The court 
provided particularly sympathetic examples of a father injured 
“picking up his infant child” and a woman injured in her work as a 
volunteer firefighter.282) 
Although the Young decision contains some sweeping language that 
seems to cast doubt on the viability of using ADA-accommodated 
employees as comparators in any context, it is essential to understand 
that the court was applying the ADA as it was interpreted prior to the 
 
 277 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); see also Grossman & Thomas, supra note at 12, at 
37 (“[C]ourts make a clear mistake . . . by assuming the validity of an on-the-job/off-
the-job distinction in order to ward off a challenge to it.”)  
 278 E.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313 (“The correct comparison is between Appellant 
and other employees who suffer non-occupational disabilities . . . .”); see also cases 
cited supra note 266. 
 279 No. 11–2078, 2013 WL 93132 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 280 Id. at *2. UPS also accommodated drivers who had lost their Department of 
Transportation certification, but these accommodations apparently did not address 
physical limitations. Id. at *10. 
 281 Young also claimed disability discrimination and race discrimination. Id. at *3. 
Applying pre-ADA amendment law, the court concluded that she was neither disabled 
nor “regarded as” disabled because her impairment was temporary. Id. at *4-5. The 
district court denied the race claim (which Young had herself sought to have 
voluntarily dismissed) and it was not pursued on appeal. Id. at *3-4. 
 282 Id. at *8. 
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ADA Amendments Act.283 The court ultimately concluded that Young 
was “dissimilar to an employee disabled under the ADA . . . [because] 
her lifting limitation was temporary and not a significant restriction on 
her ability to perform major life activities.”284 Thus, the court does not 
actually answer the question that will now arise with increasing 
regularity: if individuals with temporary restrictions are accommodated 
under the amended ADA — as they should be — can they serve as 
comparators for PDA purposes? 
A recent Seventh Circuit decision likewise concerned an employer 
with a policy that provided “accommodations to qualified individuals 
with a disability under the ADA or to those employees who sustain 
work-related injuries.”285 The court characterized the policy as 
complying with the PDA “because it does, in fact, treat nonpregnant 
employees the same as pregnant employees — both are denied an 
accommodation of light duty work for non-work-related injuries.”286 
This was clearly incorrect. The policy by its terms would require 
accommodation of some non-work-related injuries: impairments that 
met the ADA’s standard of “substantially limiting a major life activity.” 
In fact, the plaintiff in the case had proposed as a potential comparator 
another employee with mobility issues who was permitted to use a 
rolling walker.287 The circuit court discounted this worker on the 
ground that she worked for a related entity but not the same corporate 
employer,288 but the district court discounted the comparator on the 
ground that she was covered by the ADA.289 
The reasoning in these decisions turns the premise and promise of 
the PDA upside down. Prior to the ADA Amendments Act, if an 
employer accommodated an individual with a non-work-related back 
injury who could not lift heavy objects for a period of time, that 
employer was obligated to accommodate a pregnant employee with 
similar lifting restrictions. This would be true because under the pre-
amendment ADA, it was almost certain that such a limitation would 
not constitute a “qualifying disability.” Accordingly, the employer in 
 
 283 The case was filed prior to the effective date of the amendments. Id. at *4 n.7.  
 284 Id. at *10.  
 285 Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548.  
 286 Id.  
 287 Id. at 552. 
 288 Id.  
 289 See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4RM, 2010 WL 1568606, 
at *10 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010) (holding that obese individual needing “rollator” 
chair “isn’t a comparator for [plaintiff] under the PDA because [plaintiff] alleges 
[obese employee] was disabled, and the ADA presumably would apply if she were 
disabled”).  
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such a circumstance would have voluntarily accommodated a non-
work-related health condition and courts consistently (and 
appropriately) held that this meant they had to accommodate 
pregnancy equivalently. Since the enactment of the ADA Amendments 
Act, however, the man with the bad back would probably have an 
ADA-qualifying disability and thus accommodations would be 
required.290 The reasoning employed by the courts above would hold 
that he was no longer a potential comparator for PDA purposes. Thus, 
the fact that the ADA was amended to provide far more robust 
protections for disabilities generally would have the perverse effect of 
decreasing the support for pregnant employees. 
So far there have been only a few reported cases suggesting that 
ADA-accommodated employees are not proper comparators for PDA 
analysis. But the question is likely to appear far more frequently as 
more cases arising under the amended ADA, with its much more 
expansive understanding of qualifying disabilities, reach the courts. It 
is thus imperative that courts rethink the mode of analysis used in 
these cases before the assumption that ADA-accommodated employees 
are not relevant for PDA cases ossifies into accepted doctrine. 
D. Reconceptualizing Accommodation Claims 
As described above, courts generally hold that so long as an 
employer’s accommodation policy is “pregnancy blind,” and applied 
on an even-handed basis, no PDA violation has occurred; they usually 
characterize the inquiry required as typical “disparate treatment” 
analysis, like that which would be applied to a failure to hire or 
promote case.291 This might be appropriate if the PDA only included 
its first clause. If that were the case, the PDA would gain force only 
from Title VII’s general substantive provisions, and a truthful showing 
by an employer that it was not motivated by discriminatory animus 
would be an adequate defense to a disparate treatment claim, leaving 
only the possibility of making a disparate impact claim.292 But this 
analysis ignores the substantive mandate of the second clause of the 
 
 290 See supra text accompanying notes 199-202. 
 291 See, e.g., EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192 (2000) 
(“The Charging Parties’ discrimination claims are based on the Defendant’s refusal to 
place them in modified-duty assignments. This case, therefore, is analogous to those 
cases presenting failure-to-hire or failure-to-promote claims.”).  
 292 As noted above, two recent district court cases held that limiting a light-duty 
policy to workplace injuries could state a disparate impact claim, although in both 
cases there was also evidence of discriminatory animus sufficient to support a 
disparate treatment claim. See supra note 267.  
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PDA — an affirmative obligation that “women affected by 
pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same . . . as other persons . . . similar 
in their ability or inability to work.”293 As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized in other contexts, these two clauses are distinct and may 
have separate significance.294 
The analysis should therefore focus on the simple question of 
whether the employer has made accommodations for other employees 
with “similar limitations,” not on why it has made such 
accommodations. The plain text of the PDA provides that a showing of 
such differential treatment is itself sufficient to establish that an 
employer has discriminated “because of sex.” Intent should be 
irrelevant when applying the “same treatment” language. Courts 
therefore err when they classify such claims as standard disparate 
treatment claims and when they use McDonnell Douglas burden 
shifting to consider whether an exclusion of pregnancy is motivated by 
discriminatory animus. 
The circumstances under which the PDA was enacted may help 
explain why the PDA includes the “same treatment” mandate. As 
described in Part II, the PDA was a response to General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert. A primary defense raised by the company in Gilbert was that 
including pregnancy in its otherwise comprehensive disability policy 
would raise its costs; the district court credited this factual assertion, 
although it ultimately held that the practice violated Title VII.295 In 
Congress, likewise, opposition to the PDA focused on the extent to 
which including pregnancy in disability policies would increase 
 
 293 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 294 See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of 
America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983). In Young v. UPS, discussed above, the 
Fourth Circuit quotes pertinent language from these Supreme Court cases but 
nonetheless categorically rejects the contention that the comparative clause has its 
own force. Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 11–2078, 2013 WL 93132, at *7-
8 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013). This is a somewhat surprising move by an inferior court.  
 295 Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 378 (E.D. Va. 1974) (discussing 
company’s evidence showing that including maternity benefits would “increase G.E.’s 
costs” by a “large amount” and concluding that “[i]t is because of these increased 
costs that G.E. has refused to grant maternity benefits”). The Supreme Court accepted 
these factual findings and specifically rejected the contention that excluding 
pregnancy from the disability policy was “pretext for discriminating against women,” 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976), although the dissent argued that 
the policy was part of a more general hostility to women working while pregnant. Id. 
at 150 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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costs.296 Moreover, at the time that the PDA was enacted, there were 
several states that mandated employers provide short-term disability 
benefits, but that either excluded pregnancy or that permitted 
pregnancy to be treated less generously than other disabilities.297 
In other words, at the time the PDA was drafted and enacted, 
employers already claimed that ostensibly pregnancy-blind factors 
such as “cost” or “compliance with statutory mandates” justified 
excluding pregnancy from disability policies. Thus, it was already 
clear that structuring the statute to require proof of discriminatory 
animus would likely fail to end these practices. The same treatment 
language, properly interpreted, ensures that pregnancy — a health 
condition only affecting women — is treated as well as other 
comparable limitations, even if an employer’s failure to do so is not 
itself based on explicit or even implicit bias against women.298 
The PDA’s same treatment language is thus akin to other aspects of 
employment discrimination law that require modifying employer 
policies even in the absence of proven discriminatory intent. These 
include not only disparate impact doctrine and prohibitions on so-
called “rational” discrimination, but also the reasonable 
accommodation mandates contained in the religious discrimination 
definition of Title VII and in the ADA.299 Notably, both of these other 
accommodation mandates are, like the PDA, characterized as 
definitional; courts nonetheless readily acknowledge that they create 
substantive claims that are distinct from any showing of 
discriminatory intent.300 Although the PDA does not explicitly require 
accommodations, it makes clear that if other comparable limitations 
are being accommodated — either because an employer has 
independently made a business judgment that this is worth doing, or 
because it has agreed to do so in collective bargaining, or because a 
statutory mandate requires it — pregnancy must be too. Of course, 
some accommodations may be too expensive for some employers to 
take on (for example, creating an entirely new position for an 
 
 296 See supra text accompanying note 157. 
 297 See supra text accompanying note 163. 
 298 As a theoretical matter, disparate impact should operate as a vehicle to 
challenge workplace policies that fail to adequately address pregnancy, but as a 
practical matter, such claims have usually been unsuccessful. See supra note 264. 
 299 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 300 See, e.g., Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134-36 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(analyzing a claim of failure to accommodate a disability as distinct from claim of 
disability “discrimination”); Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(analyzing a claim of denial of religious accommodation as distinct from a claim of 
religious “discrimination”).  
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employee), but that is the determination that must be made in a 
pregnancy-blind manner. As soon as the employer has offered a given 
accommodation to an individual for non-pregnancy-related needs, it 
must offer the same accommodation to an employee with similar 
limitations caused by pregnancy. 
The comparative language thus reduces the tensions that animated 
the special treatment/equal treatment debate. It avoids singling 
pregnancy out for “special treatment” and thus prompting 
discrimination against pregnant or potentially pregnant employees, a 
category that could include all women under the age of fifty. And, by 
limiting the accommodation mandate to instances in which an 
employer has already provided comparable limitations for other 
disabilities, it diminishes the extent to which providing such 
accommodations reinforces stereotypes that women are less capable 
workers than men or that their responsibilities to family take 
precedence over paid work. 
The PDA’s comparative clause provides the benefit of a relatively 
bright-line rule, while incorporating, in a derivative fashion, 
employers’ legitimate concerns over costs. That is, the ADA’s statutory 
directive to provide “reasonable accommodations” is balanced with 
the limitation that they are only required if they would not impose an 
“undue hardship.”301 In collective bargaining, or in independently 
fashioning policies such as disability leave, employers likewise weigh 
the costs and benefits of pre-committing to accommodations. 
Employers also consider costs if they handle accommodation requests 
in a more ad hoc manner. Although extending comparable 
accommodations to pregnant employees will obviously increase costs, 
a rough cost-benefit analysis has already occurred. Moreover, it has 
been conducted without the overlay of still prevalent stereotypes and 
bias about the capacity of pregnant employees or the likelihood that 
pregnant employees return to work after childbirth. The incremental 
extra costs associated with pregnancy accommodation — applied to an 
employer that already bears costs with respect to other disabilities or 
conditions — is precisely what the PDA anticipates.302 
That said, an objection to my argument might be that Congress may 
have failed to consider the interaction of the PDA with the ADA when 
it enacted, and later amended, the latter statute. There are at least 
three responses to this potential concern. The first is that the intent 
(or in this case, the far more nebulous concept of the absence of clear 
 
 301 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 302 See supra text accompanying notes 158-159. 
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evidence of Congressional intent) of the 101st Congress that passed 
the ADA in 1990, or the 110th Congress that amended it in 2008, is 
irrelevant to interpretation of the PDA. Some jurists categorically 
refuse to consider any evidence of Congressional intent or purpose 
other than the statutory text itself.303 Many others, who might consider 
non-textual signals of Congressional intent or purpose in some 
contexts, would nonetheless focus their attention on the Congress that 
enacted that PDA, rather than the later Congresses.304 Changing 
circumstances frequently cause old statutes to have new 
implications,305 and interpreting the PDA to require accommodations 
comparable to those provided disabled employees advances the PDA’s 
underlying purpose of ensuring that pregnancy is treated at least as 
well as other health conditions that similarly impact work.306 
 
 303 Strict textualists, including most prominently Justice Scalia, generally eschew 
consideration of legislative purpose as expressed in, or inferred from, evidence outside 
the text of the statute. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 29-33 (2012) (arguing objective of statutory 
interpretation should be to give effect to the statutory text, not the drafter’s subjective 
intent); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“It is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.”). 
 304 The premise is that later Congresses should not be able to implicitly 
circumscribe earlier enactments; it is closely related to the strong disfavor of repeals 
by implication. See infra text accompanying notes 310-313. I have suggested elsewhere 
that later-enacted statutes overriding earlier judicial interpretations of a statute can be 
significant to statutory interpretation of other earlier-enacted statutes with similar 
language, see Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides, supra note 229, at 933-34, 
but that is in response to specific interpretive challenges not implicated in this 
question of the interaction of the ADA and the PDA. 
 305 This basic truth is accepted by those who advocate an “originalist” approach to 
statutory interpretation and more flexible “dynamic” theorists. See, e.g., SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 303, at 78, 80 (observing that courts “routinely apply legal 
instruments to novel situations over time” and that therefore the “application of a 
stable meaning to new phenomenon” might cause new outcomes); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483-84 
(1987) (advocating evolution of statutory meaning to respond to new circumstances 
or political dynamics). To the extent there is disagreement, it occurs when the 
meaning of relevant language in the older statute has itself changed due to linguistic 
evolution or when applying the natural reading of the older language to a new 
situation seems contrary to the likely purpose or intent of the Congress that enacted 
the older statute. Compare SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 303, at 80 (advocating that 
the original meaning must be retained), with Eskridge, supra, at 1483 (advocating that 
interpreters consider the statutory text, the original legislative expectations, and the 
subsequent evolution of the statute and the present context). Neither of those 
concerns is implicated here. 
 306 See supra Part II.C. In the context of the Cal Fed controversy, Wendy Williams, 
a primary drafter of the PDA, argued against the “special treatment” approach in part 
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Second, to the extent that the intent or purpose of the later 
Congresses is relevant at all, there is a longstanding principle of 
statutory interpretation that Congress is presumed to enact new 
legislation with background knowledge of existing legislation.307 The 
empirical validity of this presumption is often open to question. In this 
context, however, it may well be reasonable: the ADA was largely 
modeled on Title VII and both address employment discrimination.308 
Thus, Congress should be presumed to understand that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation language could implicate employers’ 
responsibilities under the PDA. 
Third, and most importantly, the contrary interpretation endorsed 
by a few courts — that is, that ADA-accommodated employees are not 
appropriate comparators for PDA analysis — would mean that 
Congress’s expansion of statutory protections for disabilities generally 
would decrease employers’ responsibilities to pregnant employees in 
any case where the employer would have voluntarily accommodated 
the non-pregnancy condition.309 This result was also not discussed by 
the Congress that enacted the ADA or its amendments, and it is highly 
unlikely that either Congress intended this perverse effect. In fact, as 
discussed above, interpreting the PDA in this manner would 
functionally erase the PDA’s “same treatment” language. Thus, it could 
be characterized as a repeal by implication, which are highly 
disfavored. As the Supreme Court has explained: 
 
on the ground that disabilities policies had already been expanded to include 
pregnancy, demonstrating that “major change is indeed possible” and that accordingly 
“to settle for special treatment . . . would be to sell equality short.” Williams, Equality’s 
Riddle, supra note 13, at 380. The ADA, like the FMLA, is evidence of her point that 
“major change” in support of health conditions generally is possible.  
 307 See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 896 (1988) (noting “the well-
settled presumption that Congress understands the state of existing law when it 
legislates”); United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress is, 
of course, presumed to know existing law pertinent to any new legislation it enacts.”). 
 308 The ADA and Title VII are under the jurisdiction of many of the same 
committees in Congress, the basic structure of the ADA’s antidiscrimination language 
applicable to employers largely parallels Title VII’s, and even the reasonable 
accommodation provision is similar to Title VII’s religious discrimination provisions. 
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) and id. § 2000e-2(a) (2012), with id. § 12112 
(2012). As William Buzbee argues, the presumption that Congress has background 
knowledge is more likely to be warranted in instances in which the new bill attacks 
similar problems as existing legislation and is under the jurisdiction of the same 
committees. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory 
Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 212 (2000).  
 309 See supra text accompanying note 290.  
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The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among 
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable 
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard 
each as effective.310 
Thus, the Supreme Court “has not hesitated to give effect to two 
statutes that overlap, so long as each reaches some distinct cases.”311 A 
repeal by implication, by contrast, is permitted only when there is “an 
irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes at issue.”312 The 
Supreme Court sometimes engages in extremely tortured 
interpretations to avoid finding a later statute implicitly repealed an 
earlier one.313 In this case, no such contortions are required. The 
interpretation I propose is the natural reading of the PDA’s plain text 
and a reasonable means of harmonizing two statutes with a common 
purpose: increasing employment opportunities for employees with 
health conditions that impact their ability to work. 
In applying the same treatment language, the PDA’s focus on 
functional limitations in an individual’s “ability to work,” rather than 
the nature of the underlying condition, is essential. Pregnancy does 
not map neatly onto impairments that are more classically recognized 
as disabilities. For example, although pregnancy may cause limitations 
in lifting like those caused by a back injury, it is not itself a muscular-
 
 310 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). This rule is longstanding. See, 
e.g., Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“The cardinal rule is that 
repeals by implication are not favored.”). 
 311 J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001). 
 312 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 313 See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(acknowledging a later amendment is unquestionably “in tension” with an earlier 
provision, and that much of the older provision is unconstitutional, but nonetheless 
declining to find a repeal by implication). In one recent high-profile case, the Supreme 
Court held that later legislation implicitly narrowed the reach of earlier legislation. See 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 155-59 (2000). The Court 
justified that decision by referencing a canon of statutory interpretation that suggests 
the meaning of a general statute can be affected by more specific statutes. Id. at 133. 
The canon generally is used only where there is a conflict between the earlier and later 
statutes. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 303, at 183. (Its application in Brown 
Williamson, a case in which the conflict was less-than-apparent, likely reflects the sui 
generis nature of tobacco politics.) As explained in the text, the ADA and the PDA 
may be readily harmonized to give effect to each statute, so the canon is wholly 
inapplicable. Moreover, to the extent there were deemed to be any conflict between 
the statutes, the more general ADA should not be interpreted to limit the PDA’s scope 
with respect to pregnancy, since the PDA is the more specific statute. 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
1032 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:961 
skeletal impairment, and although pregnancy may require frequent 
snacks similar to those required by some diabetics, it is not itself an 
impairment of the pancreas. Courts should focus on the extent to 
which employers have accommodated limitations like those imposed 
by pregnancy, including a need for time off or a modified schedule, 
not whether the impairments themselves are like pregnancy. In one 
recent case, a pregnant security guard sought to be assigned to a 
visitors’ center rather than the entry gate because it required less 
physical activity.314 A diabetic security guard had been assigned to the 
visitor center so that he could have regularly scheduled breaks and 
meals. In this instance, the employees were similar in “their ability or 
inability to work”: each could work as a security guard at the visitor 
center but not at the outside gate. The fact the employer had 
accommodated the diabetic employee by assigning him to the visitor 
center established that it was not unduly difficult for the employer to 
do so. This is the key factor a court should consider, not that diabetes 
and pregnancy are quite different or even that the reason why each 
employee needed to be assigned to the visitor center differed. 
When an employer has already provided accommodations, the 
analysis should be straightforward. The PDA requires that the 
employer “shall” provide a comparable accommodation to an 
individual with similar limitations caused by pregnancy. This 
conclusion may seem more intuitive when applied to individuals with 
(non-work-related) conditions accommodated pursuant to the ADA 
than when applied to individuals with job-related injuries who receive 
light duty positions. Employers might argue that other areas of 
employment law distinguish between work and non-work injuries or 
that employers naturally bear greater responsibility for 
accommodating workplace injuries. These claims are unconvincing. 
First, it is important to recognize that light duty positions are widely 
available because they reduce employer liability under workers’ 
compensation statutes; like ADA-required accommodations, they are 
also (at least often) a response to statutory mandates.315 Second, and 
more importantly, the plain language of the PDA provides for no such 
distinctions. The EEOC seems to understand this. The EEOC guidance 
discussed above regarding job modifications for pregnancy does not 
 
 314 Denton v. CSC Applied Tech., No. 1:07CV115-D-D, 2008 WL 4821332, at *3 
(N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 2008). The position actually listed the same physical 
requirements as the entry gates so the plaintiff apparently conceded during litigation 
that she did not meet these requirements; in practice, however, the physical 
requirements of the position were apparently less demanding. Id.  
 315 See supra text accompanying note 94. 
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differentiate between on-the-job and off-the-job injuries.316 Similarly, 
in the ADA context, the EEOC has asserted that even if an employer 
generally reserves light duty positions for employees with workplace 
injuries, the ADA may require assigning an individual with a (non-
work-related) disability to a vacant light duty position as a reasonable 
accommodation.317 
That said, courts in circuits with decisions holding employees 
accommodated pursuant to a light duty policy are not appropriate 
comparators for PDA purposes might feel compelled to follow that 
precedent when deciding claims concerning such light duty policies. 
Crucially important, however, courts should recognize that applying 
the reasoning in those light duty cases to similarly exclude ADA-
accommodated employees as potential comparators would be a 
significant — and unwarranted — expansion of the doctrine. Rather, 
courts should recognize that the light duty decisions consistently and 
correctly opined that if an employer had accommodated employees 
with out-of-work injuries or health conditions, it would also be 
required to accommodate pregnant employees.318 As explained above, 
the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, which increases the 
number of out-of-work injuries and health conditions that must be 
accommodated, should not change this analysis in any respect.319 The 
reason why an employer accommodates the out-of-work injury should 
be irrelevant under the PDA. 
Harder questions arise if the specific employer has not already 
provided accommodations like those requested by a pregnant 
employee. In this scenario, if the ADA would require an employer to 
make comparable accommodations, pregnancy should be 
accommodated even in the absence of a specific “comparator” because 
 
 316 See supra text accompanying note 257. 
 317 EEOC, NOTICE NUMBER 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: Workers 
Compensation and the ADA (2000) (question 28), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/workcomp.html. 
 318 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(“The correct comparison is between Appellant and other employees who suffer non-
occupational disabilities.”); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (denying PDA claim on ground “Continental treated Urbano in exactly the 
same manner as it would have treated any other worker who was injured off the job”).  
 319 See supra text accompanying notes 309-313. The ADA Amendments Act 
contained a provision explicitly prohibiting individuals without a disability from 
making claims under the ADA itself. See ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-335, 
§ 6(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (2009)). This 
provision, designed to preclude so-called “reverse discrimination” claims under the 
ADA, see H.R. REP. No. 110-730, at 21 (2008), should have no relevance to claims 
brought under the PDA.  
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courts should presume that employers would comply with the ADA.320 
Pregnancy accommodations would not be required if the court 
determined that the ADA would not require the accommodation. To 
see this distinction, consider the following example. A recent PDA 
case was brought by a director of activities at a nursing center who 
was able to do almost all of her job. However, her doctor had 
instructed that she should refrain from moving heavy objects, tasks 
that she estimated occupied about five to ten minutes of typical days, 
and from climbing on a table to fill in the top week on a wall-sized 
calendar, a task that she was required to do just once a month.321 
(These facts illustrate well the picayune level of details these cases 
often include.) She also stated that her coworkers routinely helped her 
with these tasks, even prior to her pregnancy.322 Even if the employer 
had not accommodated an individual with similar limitations caused 
by a different health condition, it should be required to accommodate 
her pregnancy. 
The analysis would be as follows. A back injury that made it 
inadvisable to move heavy objects or climb on a table would be 
considered an “impairment” that causes a “substantial limitation” in 
the “major life activity” of “lifting.”323 Under the amended ADA, the 
employer would be required to provide a reasonable accommodation 
for the limitation, unless doing so would be an undue hardship. 
Ensuring an employee has assistance for 5-10 minutes of the day, 
particularly where coworkers routinely provided such assistance 
anyway, would not be an undue hardship. Accordingly, under the 
PDA, the pregnant employee should be treated “the same” as the 
hypothetical employee with the ADA-qualifying back injury and thus 
receive the accommodation. If, by contrast, the employee’s primary 
responsibility at work, throughout the day, was lifting heavy objects, 
any potential accommodation would be more likely to constitute an 
undue hardship. In such a scenario, a court could reasonably conclude 
that an accommodation would not be required under the ADA, and 
accordingly the PDA would not require that the employer 
accommodate the pregnant employee. 
The doctrinal analysis set forth in this subpart is well grounded in 
the plain text of the PDA and its underlying commitment to treating 
 
 320 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 247, at 805 (describing use of “hypothetical 
comparators” in European antidiscrimination law).  
 321 See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4, 2010 WL 1568606, at 
*1-2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010).  
 322 Id. at *1. 
 323 See supra text accompanying notes 198-201. 
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pregnancy like other health conditions that can interfere with work. 
The ADA Amendments Act raises the floor regarding employers’ 
responsibilities for addressing physical limitations of employees; 
pregnancy should not be left once again in the basement. 
CONCLUSION 
Part III established that, properly interpreted, the PDA requires that 
employers that accommodate employees pursuant to the ADA or a 
light duty policy provide comparable accommodations for pregnant 
employees. This should provide recourse for a significant number of 
women who would otherwise lose their jobs, be placed on unpaid 
leave, or risk their health to continue working without any 
recommended modifications. Relying on the PDA’s same treatment 
language, however, has limitations. 
Most obviously, it is comparative, not absolute.324 Finding a 
comparator could be a very serious hurdle for many employees. 
Recognizing pregnancy as a disability under the ADA or affirmatively 
mandating pregnancy accommodations would remove this problem. 
Towards this end, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act was introduced 
in 112th Congress and likely will be reintroduced in the current 
Congress. This bill would explicitly require employers covered by 
Title VII and the ADA to make “reasonable accommodations to the 
known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions” of an employee, unless doing so would impose an 
“undue hardship” on the employer.325 The bill is unlikely to advance 
at this time, but if it were to pass in the future, it would be an 
important step forward because it would remove the need to engage in 
comparative analysis entirely. 
That said, the architects of the PDA were right to worry that “special 
treatment” can breed resentment or backlash.326 This is already a 
 
 324 Moreover, even if courts accept the general contours of the argument, they 
might be unwilling to apply it in the absence of a specific identified comparator who 
has actually received an accommodation, rather than the more speculative 
understanding that the ADA would require a comparable accommodation. 
 325 Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 3565, 112th Cong. (2012); Pregnant 
Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. (2012). At the time of this writing, the 
bill has not yet been reintroduced in the 113th Congress that began sitting in January 
2013. 
 326 A rich body of empirical work attempts to assess whether the ADA, with its 
reasonable accommodation mandate, has increased hiring discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities or backlash against employees at work. See, e.g., Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (2004) (collecting and 
discussing studies). See generally also Adrienne Colella et al., Factors Affecting 
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concern under the comparative approach adopted in the PDA; 
explicitly mandating accommodations for pregnancy would heighten 
the risk. In fact, introduction of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act 
was reported in the New York Times’s parenting blog. The comments 
posted by readers are striking, even recognizing that the forum tends 
to breed hyper-opinionated responses. Many readers applauded the 
bill as long overdue, often sharing stories of being denied 
accommodations.327 But others expressed vitriolic anger that women 
with “lousy low paying” jobs “impregnated by the smoothest-talking 
guy on the block”328 would be able to “shift the burdens” of their 
“lifestyle choice” to others,329 as well as concern that women would 
regularly abuse the policy,330 or that “this kind of garbage” would 
make employers reluctant to hire women at all.331 This is a danger that 
accommodation mandates pose within a legal structure that posits 
“color-blindness” and “sex-blindness” as the general marker of 
 
Coworkers’ Procedural Justice Inferences of the Workplace Accommodations of Employees 
with Disabilities, 57 PERS. PSYCHOL. 1 (2004) (suggesting procedures that can increase 
coworker acceptance of accommodations for employees with disabilities). Although 
results are inconclusive, it is fair to say that anecdotal evidence demonstrates that this 
occurs in some workplaces. 
 327 See, e.g., Jane, Comment to Protection for Pregnant Workers, MOTHERLODE: 
ADVENTURES IN PARENTING, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2012, 1:47 PM), 
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/protection-for-pregnant-workers/ (“As 
an ob/gyn I see countless episodes where employees are harassed, shamed, and made 
to feel guilty solely for being pregnant.”); HRM, Comment to id. (May 8, 2012, 3:56 
PM) (“When I was pregnant with twins . . . , my ‘feminist’ dissertation advisor tried to 
have me kicked out of the program.”). 
 328 See Chris, Comment to id. (May 11, 2012, 8:52 AM) (“If a woman has a lousy 
low paying job that will not offer the needed accommodation, . . . she should get more 
education and save more money before having children. And/or select a husband who 
will stick around and support the child rather than becoming impregnated by the 
smoothest-talking guy on the block.”) 
 329 See Skeptical, Comment to id. (May 10, 2012, 9:41 AM) (“I . . . would like to 
make childbearing harder on working women so that perhaps they will put more 
thought in their decisions to procreate, and will take more personal responsibility for 
their lifestyle choice rather than trying the shift the burdens to others.”); D.mutchler, 
Comment to id. (May 10, 2012, 1:53 PM) (“[It] does smack a bit of unfairness . . . . 
Entitlement is an ugly thing.”).  
 330 See Abby, Comment to id. (May 9, 2012, 10:15 AM) (“I practice employment 
law. . . . Some employees abuse these policies. It is really easy to get a doctor to 
recommend that a pregnant employee be given a reduced schedule, . . . [which is] 
hard on the other employees who must should extra responsibilities.”)  
 331 See Jane, Comment to id. (May 9, 2012, 8:03 PM) (“This kind of garbage in 
employment law [will mean] NO employer wants to take a chance on women of child 
bearing age ever again.”) 
WIDISS MACRO V4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2013 3:56 PM 
2013] Gilbert Redux 1037 
equality. An accommodation framework may respond to the fact that 
baselines are discriminatory, but it does not change them. 
The pregnancy accommodation story hints at a different approach. 
Recall that Part I identified several typical accommodations that 
pregnant women might need at work: limitations on weights required 
to be lifted; regular breaks; access to seating; day shifts; and limits on 
excessive overtime. In the current political landscape, a guaranteed 
right to such “accommodations” seems unlikely. Not so for women 
working in the first half of the twentieth century. These were all 
standard provisions in the sex-specific “protective” labor legislation 
then common. Of course, as discussed in Part II, there were serious 
problems with this legal regime. Undoubtedly the lifting restrictions, 
seats, and breaks were helpful for some women in some pregnancies, 
or for women who faced other physical limitations. But they were 
grossly overbroad in that they applied to all women (and 
underinclusive in that they did not help men with physical 
limitations). The laws that established a cap on women’s hours were 
more generally useful, in that they protected time for family 
responsibilities and other non-work interests.332 But they also helped 
reify the assumption that caregiving was solely the responsibility of 
women, meant women could not receive premium pay under FLSA, 
and made women less attractive candidates for a range of jobs, 
including professional and managerial positions.333 Notwithstanding 
these real costs, many advocates supported the laws in part because 
they believed they could be used as an “opening wedge” to establish 
more humane workplace standards for all workers.334 They were right. 
As Justice Ginsburg recently observed, Muller v. Oregon, the case 
that upheld a ten-hour-per-day cap on women’s work in certain 
industries, has two different legacies.335 One is as evidence of the 
discriminatory attitudes towards women that the Supreme Court once 
held. In this respect, it is usually cited as a kind of “negative” 
precedent, often lumped together with Bradwell v. Illinois (1872) and 
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948), which each upheld bars on women working 
in certain occupations.336 But Muller was also the first step in 
 
 332 See, e.g., COBBLE, supra note 36, at 139-44 (discussing women’s interest in 
limiting daily work hours); PCSW, AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 76, at 132-33 
(similar).  
 333 See COBBLE, supra note 36, at 142; PCSW, AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 76, at 
55-57. 
 334 KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 72, at 184. 
 335 Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 368-70. 
 336 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003) (citing 
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dismantling the restrictive understanding of government’s powers 
announced by Lochner v. United States,337 a case now also almost 
universally acknowledged as “wrong.”338 Albeit relying on overbroad 
and deeply stereotyped assumptions of women’s need for protection, 
Muller began the doctrinal path towards recognition that Congress’s 
authority to promote the general welfare and regulate interstate 
commerce may be properly expressed in labor legislation — and that 
many workers of both sexes can benefit from government action to set 
decent labor standards. 
The Lochner rule was effectively abandoned in West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, a case that upheld a women’s-only minimum wage law on a 
broader rationale than earlier cases.339 Recognizing that the 
constitutional ground had shifted, advocates understood that they 
could now press for a sex-neutral minimum wage. The federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act was passed the next year.340 It was a sex-neutral 
law that set minimum wages, established the forty-hour workweek as 
standard, and required premium pay for overtime hours. Although 
originally it excluded numerous industries, it has gradually been 
expanded and now covers most workplaces.341 State labor laws were 
enacted or amended so that they parallel or expand upon FLSA, 
covering smaller enterprises, imposing a higher minimum wage, or 
mandating other basic labor standards such as mandatory break times 
within shifts.342 These are vestiges of statutes that were once a form of 
 
all three cases as evidence of “the many state laws limiting women’s employment 
opportunities . . . [once] sanctioned by this Court”). I develop and discuss the concept 
of negative precedent in Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing History: The Use of 
Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237 (1998). 
 337 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 338 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 
(1980) (stating that Lochner is “one of the most condemned cases in United States 
history and has been used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse”).  
 339 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and 
employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there 
may be suitable protection of health and safety.”). 
 340 Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012).  
 341 The minimum wage provisions apply to almost all employees whose work is 
connected in various ways to interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). Executive, 
professional, and administrative positions, as well as some specific industries, are 
exempted from the overtime requirements. Id. § 207. There are a few key exceptions. 
For example, agricultural workers and domestic workers receive less robust or no 
protection under FLSA. See id. § 206(a)(4), (f).  
 342 See, e.g., Wage and Hour Division, Minimum Wage Laws in States-January 1, 
2012 (2012), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/ 
america.htm (last visited January 28, 2013) (showing many states have set minimum 
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“special treatment” for women. They are not perceived that way any 
more. They are “accommodations” that have been successfully 
universalized. 
As discussed above, when Title VII was enacted, feminist leaders 
were divided over the advisability of dismantling the “protective” labor 
laws, particularly the cap on hours. A similar debate occurred during 
and after the Cal Fed case regarding the advisability of mandating 
maternity leaves. In each instance, an “equal treatment” approach 
prevailed, rather than competing arguments for preserving or enacting 
women-specific rights that could — perhaps — have later been 
expanded. Laws prohibiting mandatory overtime for women were 
repealed, and the only federal statute that seeks to accommodate 
family caretaking is the sex-neutral FMLA. Its limitations, the result of 
multiple compromises over several years of efforts to enact it, are well 
recognized. The FMLA was an important step forward compared to a 
baseline of no protection. But in today’s world, where women and men 
both struggle to balance work and family responsibilities, one wonders 
what our workplaces would look like if we had continued farther 
down that other path.343 
 
 
wages above the federal level). 
 343 International comparisons may be illuminating here. In many other countries, 
women have long had a right to paid maternity leaves, and legislative bodies 
responded to calls for gender equity by enacting parental leaves that are available to 
mothers and to fathers or (much shorter) separate paternal leaves. See, e.g., 
Christopher J. Ruhm, Policies to Assist Parents with Young Children, 21 THE FUTURE 
CHILD. 37, 40-43 (2011). Although mothers remain more likely to take parental leave 
than fathers, a growing number of countries have enacted provisions that incentivize 
paternal leave-taking. See id. Several countries have also enacted flexible working 
statutes that make it easier for employees to receive adjusted work schedules; in at 
least five countries, this has been structured as a universal employee right rather than 
a limited benefit for specific needs such as parenting or education. See ARIANE 
HEGEWISCH & JANET C. GORNICK, STATUTORY ROUTES TO WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY IN 
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (2008).  
